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[A]t the confluence of two streams of concern which 
flow through our polity-our concern for the 
protection of our First Amendment freedoms 
and our concern for the protection of our 
children . .. we expect to hear a roar 
rather than a purr. 1 
I. !NTRODUcnON 
In the era when the broadcast media were the cutting edge of informa-
tion technology, the United States Supreme Court recognized society's 
interest in protecting children from exposure to indecent material in radio and 
television programming. In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,2 the Supreme Court 
* Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma. A.B., 1968, Franklin & Marshall Col-
lege; M.S., 1970; M.A. 1976, Ph.D., 1978, University of Miami; J.D., 1984. University of 
Michigan. Professor Saunders is spending the year as the Visiting James Madison Chair and 
Acting Director of the Constitutional Law Resource Center at Drake University Law School. He 
wishes to thank Michael Meyerson and Rodney Smolla for their comments on earlier drafts of 
this Article. 
1. Crawford v. Lungren, 96 F.3d 380, 389 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding a ban on the 
sale of certain sexually explicit material through unsupervised sidewalk vending machines), 
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1249 (1997). For further discussion of the case, see infra note 384. 
2. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,750-51 (1978). 
1 
HeinOnline -- 46 Drake L. Rev. 2 1997-1998
2 Drake Law Review [Vol. 46 
held constitutional FCC rules restricting the broadcast of indecent material to 
hours when children would less likely be in the audienc~. The channeling of 
such material into late night hours was the subject of several cases before the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. In the 
last of the cases, Action for Children's Television v. FCC,3 the court approved 
but modified the FCC rules limiting indecent broadcasts to the hours between 
10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.4 Children are thus protected, at least to a degree, 
from the effects of indecent material broadcast over the air. 
While Pacifica may have been a step in the right direction, broadcast 
television and radio represent only a small part of the potential exposure of 
children to indecent images. Much of the material viewed on television is not 
broadcast but is distributed solely over cable television. That material is not 
subject to the specific regulations approved in Pacifica.s Similarly, the 
distribution of videos is not subject to Pacifica.6 Furthermore, the television 
screen is not the only source of electronic indecency. The computer monitor, 
connected to the Internet, presents similar problems, and is also not covered 
by the earlier FCC regulations. 
Recognizing the problems present in protecting children from 
indecency in new types of media, Congress has made several attempts to limit 
that variety of material, especially in the electronic media. Those efforts have 
been largely unsuccessful. The first attempt, a ban on telephone "dial-a-
porn" services, was struck down in Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC.7 The 
Court concluded that a ban on indecent, but not obscene, material could not 
be justified,S because children's exposure was limited by the fact that the 
services charged a fee.9 Furthermore, the Court noted that a total ban would 
unconstitutionally limit adult access to such materia1. 10 It is difficult to 
quarrel with the Sable decision and the telephone indecency issue because 
the limited minor exposure does not present a major concern. 
The next two congressional attempts were more significant, because they 
addressed media to which children have greater access. The first was the 
3. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc), 
cert. denied sub nom .. Pacifica Found. V. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 701 (1996). 
4. [d. at 670. The FCC regulations had actually established a 12:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. 
safe harbor, with an exception for public television and radio stations that sign off the air prior 
to midnight. [d. at 656. Such stations were allowed to broadcast indecent material after 10: 00 
p.m. [d. While the court found that the shorter safe harbor of 12:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. would 
not have been a constitutional violation, they could find no constitutional basis for the excep-
tion for the public broadcasting stations and enlarged the safe harbor for all broadcasters. [d. at 
669-70. 
5. In Pacifica, the relevant regulation was 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976), which forbid the 
use of "any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communications." FCC 
V. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 731. 
6. See id. 
7. Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). 
8. [d. at 131. 
9. [d. at 118. 
10. [d. at 131. 
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Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (Cable 
Television Act), II which addressed indecent material on cable television. The 
second was the recently passed Communications Decency Act of 1996,12 
which was contained in the Telecommunications Act of 1996.13 The 
Communications Decency Act addressed indecent material available on the 
Internet. 14 Parts of the Cable Television Act were held unconstitutional in 
Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC,l5 and the 
protections offered in the Communications Decency Act were held 
unconstitutional by federal district courts in ACLU v. Reno l6 and Shea v. 
Reno.17 The government appealed ACLU v. Reno, and the lower court 
opinion was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court. IS Hence, these 
recent attempts to protect children from indecency have failed. 
This Article presents an alternative approach to the protection of 
children from indecent images in the media. Part II discusses the case law 
background for the recent legislation, as found primarily in Pacifica and 
Sable, the Cable Television Act and the Denver decision, and the 
Communications Decency Act and the Reno decisions. Part III suggests an 
alternative approach. It begins with a discussion of the lessons to be drawn, 
and not to be drawn, from the recent cases. The background law on the legal 
basis for this approach and the doctrine of obscenity as to children will be 
presented. The discussion then turns to the regulation of indecency in cable 
programming and the regulation of indecent material on the Internet. Part III 
also briefly addresses the application of the approach to violent images in 
both media. 
II. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Case Law Prior to the Denver and Reno Cases 
The FCC v. Pacifica Foundation case arose out of the radio broadcast 
of satirist and humorist George Carlin's Filthy Words monologue.19 
Pacifica's New York City radio station broadcast the material at 2:00 p.m., as 
part of a program on contemporary attitudes toward language.2o The 
broadcast was preceded by a warning to listeners that some might find the 
11. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460, 1486 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
12. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
13. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
14. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d)(1)(A)-(B) (West Supp. 1997). 
15. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996). 
16. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). 
17. Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
18. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). 
19. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 729 (1978). 
20. [d. 
HeinOnline -- 46 Drake L. Rev. 4 1997-1998
4 Drake Law Review [Vol. 46 
language in the upcoming program offensive.21 The Carlin monologue, a 
commercially available recording, was based on the premise that there were 
seven words that you '''definitely wouldn't say, ever'" over the air.22 As 
part of the monologue, the words were repeated, time and again, in various 
colloquial contexts.23 
After receiving a complaint from an individual asserting that he and his 
young son had heard the material over his car radio, the FCC determined that 
the broadcast violated FCC regulations against the broadcast of indecent 
materiaI.24 The FCC chose not to impose sanctions, opting instead to associate 
its conclusions with the station's file, so that the conclusions could be 
considered in renewal decisions if future complaints were received.25 The 
FCC did not state that one could never say the words at issue on the radio, but 
it did conclude that such material should be broadcast only during time 
periods when children were not likely to be in the audience.26 
Pacifica appealed the FCC ruling, challenging whether the FCC had the 
statutory authority to regulate speech such as Carlin's and, if so, whether such 
a statutory grant was constitutional.27 The Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit reversed the FCC ruling and found the commission's order 
invalid.28 When the case reached the United States Supreme Court, the Court 
first determined that the statutory authority to regulate indecent broadcasts 
could be found both in federal law prohibiting the use of "'any obscene, 
indecent, or profane language'" in any radio transmission,29 and in a more 
general statute requiring the FCC generally to encourage the "'use of radio 
in the public interest."'3o 
That left the issue of whether Carlin's speech was indecent. The FCC 
did not state that Carlin's words were per se obscene,31 and Pacifica argued 
that the indecency that could be regulated under the statute encompassed only 
obscene speech.32 The Court rejected Pacifica's position, concluding that 
"indecent," as used in the statute, "merely refers to nonconformance with 
accepted standards of morality."33 
21. [d. at 730. 
22. [d. at 729 (quoting Carlin's monologue). 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 730. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 733. 
27. Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
28. Id. at 18. 
29. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 731 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976». 
30. Id. (quoting Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.c. § 303(g) (1976». 
31. The FCC described Carlin's words in the monologue as '''patently offensive: 
though not necessarily obscene." Id. 
32. Id. at 739. 
33. Id. at 740. The Court favorably quotes Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary, which defines "indecent" as '''altogether unbecoming: contrary to what the nature 
of things or what circumstances would dictate as right or expected or appropriate: hardly 
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The Court then considered the constitutionality of the FCC's restrictions 
on the broadcast of indecent language. The Court began by noting that 
broadcast media enjoy less First Amendment protection than that enjoyed by 
other media.34 While stating that the reasons for that lower protection are 
complex, the Court said that "two have relevance to the present case. "35 First, 
less protection was justified, in part, by the uniquely pervasive presence of the 
broadcast media in American life.36 Broadcast of indecent material confronts 
the individual not only in public, but in the privacy of his or her own home. 
The Court said in the home "the individual's right to be let alone plainly 
outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder."37 Beginning the 
broadcast with a warning does not provide adequate protection to one tuning 
in after the program has started, and turning the program off after hearing the 
language was an inadequate remedy.38 The Court also said that 
"broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those [children] too 
young to read."39 While other media might simply be required not to make 
indecent material available to children, channeling indecent material into 
hours when children were unlikely to be listening seemed the only effective 
way of protecting children from the broadcast of indecency.40 . 
In Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC,41 a 1988 amendment to the 
Communications Act of 1934 was chaUenged.42 The amendment imposed a 
blanket prohibition on indecent and obscene telephone messages.43 Since 
1983, Sable Communications had been offering recorded, sexually oriented 
messages over the telephone.44 No credit card was required for the service, 
but calls were billed at a higher rate with the proceeds being split between 
suitable: UNSEEMLY ... not conforming to generally accepted standards of morality. '" [d. at 
740 n.14 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1966». 
34. [d. at 748. 
3S. [d. (emphasis added). 
36. [d. 
37. [d. 
38. [d. at 748-49. 
39. [d. at 749. 
40. [d. at 748-S0. 
41. Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. lIS (1989). 
42. [d. at 117. The section was declared unconstitutional. See Communications Act 
Amendment of 1988, 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1994) (as amended by Departments of Labor, Health 
and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990, § S 21 , 
Pub. L. No. 101-166, 103 Stat. lIS9, 1192). 
43. Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. at II7. Earlier congressional 
attempts to limit such material had concentrated on preventing communication with minors by 
requiring credit cards, access codes, or descramblers that could be sold only to adults. [d. at 
121. The amendment at issue in Sable abandoned such approaches and instead imposed a 
blanket ban on telephonic indecency for adults, as well as for minors. [d. 
44. [d. at 117-18. 
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Sable and Pacific Bell Telephone.45 Sable sought declaratory and injunctive 
relief against enforcement of the amendment.46 
The Court found no fault with the ban on obscene telephone messages, 
noting that it had repeatedly held that obscene speech does not enjoy the 
protection of the First Amendment.47 Sable did argue that the obscenity 
portion of the amendment had created a national standard for obscenity and 
would require them "to tailor ... messages to the least tolerant community" 
that could access their recordings.48 Nevertheless, the Court did not find any 
inconsistency with the Miller v. California49 requirement of community 
standards of obscenity.50 The Court said that the amendment no more 
imposed a national standard than did laws prohibiting mailing .obscene 
materials.51 Sable was said to be "free to tailor its messages ... to the 
communities it [chose] to serve."52 
With respect to the ban on indecent messages, the Court found that part 
of the amendment was constitutionally flawed.53 Indecent, but non obscene 
speech does enjoy First Amendment protection.54 Therefore, regulation 
requires a compelling interest and the restriction must be "the least restrictive 
means of furthering" that interest.55 The Court recognized a compelling 
interest in the protection of "the physical and psychological well-being" of 
children that extended to shielding children from indecent material.56 
Nonetheless, the attempt to shield must be narrowly drawn.57 
The FCC sought to justify its complete ban, despite the narrowly drawn 
requirement, on the basis of Pacifica.58 The Court, however, found the cases 
easily distinguishable.59 First, Pacifica had only channeled indecent speech 
and left adults with late hour access.60 Here, because of the total ban on 
indecent speech~ adult access was completely limited to messages considered 
fit for children.61 Furthermore, Pacifica had relied on the "'unique' 
attributes" of the broadcast media.62 The pervasiveness and the accessibility 
45. Id. at 118. 
46. /d. 
47. Id. at 124. 
48. Id. 
49. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The Miller obscenity test is discussed 
infra at note 340 and accompanying text. 
50. Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. at 124. 
51. Id. at 124-25. 
52. Id. at 125. 
53. Id. at 126. 
54. Id. at 127. 
55. Id. at 126. 
56. Id. 
57. [d. 
58. Id. at 127. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
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to children even too young to read that allowed regulation in those media 
were not present in dial-a-porn.63 Accessing a telephone recording requires 
the affirmative act of placing a call.64 One making such a call and paying for 
the service is not surprised by the message, and the message cannot be said to 
be invasive.65 The Court stated that the interest in protecting children could 
be addressed by the less restrictive means of screening out minors through the 
requirement of credit cards or other similar means.66 
Three other cases require mention because they were important to Sable 
or were seen by the court in Shea v. Reno as limiting Pacifica. The case 
important to Sable and important in any approach to protecting minors from 
exposure to indecency is Butler v. Michigan.67 Butler was the appeal of a 
conviction for violating a Michigan statute proscribing the possession, sale, 
and publication of materials that were obscene or "tending to incite minors to 
violent or depraved or immoral acts, manifestly tending to the corruption of 
the morals of youth."68 Butler had not been convicted of distributing such 
material to a minor. Rather, he had made the material available for sale to the 
general public and had sold a book to a police officer that would, the trial 
court found, have a potentially deleterious effect on youth.69 The Court 
refused Michigan's attempt to protect its youth by preventing adults from 
obtaining materials that were not obscene.7o The constitutional flaw was that 
the statute "reduce[d] the adult population of Michigan to reading only what 
is fit for children."7) 
The relevance to Sable is obvious. The anti-dial-a-porn statute in Sable 
had sought to protect minors from indecency by restricting the access of 
everyone to such telephone messages, and thus, the entire population was 
reduced to hearing only what was fit for children. These cases are relevant to 
any attempt to limit the access of minors to indecent material on cable 
television or the Internet. Whatever restrictions are imposed must leave adults 
with reasonable access to non obscene material. 
The remaining two relevant cases are Bolger v. Young Drug Products 
Corp.72 and Turner Broadcasting Sy,stem, Inc. v. FCC.73 The Bolger case was 
a challenge to a federal statute prohibiting the mailing of unsolicited 
advertisements for contraceptives.74 The Court held the statute 
63. [d. at 127-28. 
64. [d. at 128. 
65. [d. 
66. [d. 
67. Butler v. Michigan. 352 U.S. 380 (1957). 
68. [d. at 381 (quoting MICH. COMPo LAWS § 750.343 (Supp. 1954». 
69. [d. 
70. [d. 
71. [d. at 382-83. 
72. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp .• 463 U.S. 60 (1983). 
73. Turner Broad. Sys .• Inc. v. FCC. 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994). 
74. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp .• 463 U.S. at 61 (referring to 39 U.S.C. § 3001 
(e)(2) (1982». 
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unconstitutional,7S and while most of the analysis was with regard to the 
protection of commercial speech, there is language relevant to the issues in the 
cable and Internet cases. The Bolger Court first characterized Butler as 
leading to the conclusion that "[t]he level of discourse reaching a mailbox 
simply cannot be limited to that which would be suitable for a sandbox."76 
The Court then considered the Pacifica case, noting that the case did 
recognize a governmental interest in protecting youth that "justified special 
treatment of an afternoon broadcast" heard by both adults and youths,11 The 
Pacifica opinion, however, had characterized itself as a narrow holding based 
on the pervasiveness of the media involved and the unique access of that 
medium to children.78 The Bolger Court concluded that the receipt of mail 
was "far less intrusive and uncontrollable" than the broadcast media, and 
went on to say, "our decisions have recognized that the special interest of the 
Federal Government in regulation of the broadcast media does not readily 
translate into a justification for regulation of other means of 
communication."79 If it had not already been clear from the Pacifica 
opinion, Bolger makes it clear that caution should be exercised in attempting 
to extend Pacifica beyond its own context. 
The Turner case concerned the regulatory authority of the FCC over the 
cable television industry.80 Specifically, the challenge was to the "must 
carry" provisions of the Cable Television Act.81 Those provisions required 
that cable systems carry local broadcast television stations as a part of their 
cable offerings.82 The lower court granted summary judgment to the FCC, 
and the United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment, sending the case 
back for the resolution of issues of fact. 83 In doing so, the Court cited the 
Bolger language stating that the government's power to regulate the broadcast 
media does not translate easily to other media.84 The Court also discussed the 
scarcity rationale for FCC regulation of the broadcast media.85 The public 
ownership of the airwaves and the limited number of broadcasts that can be 
allowed on the radio-television spectrum, without interfering with each other, 
75. Id. at 75. 
76. Id. at 74. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2452-53 (1994). 
81. Id. (discussing sections 4 and 5 of the Cable Television Act of 1992, 47 U.S.C. § 
534 (h)(1)(A), (C) (1994». 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 2472. After remand, and after the lower court Internet decisions, the "must 
carry" issue returned to the Supreme Court. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 117 S. Ct. 
1174 (1997). The Court concluded that the provisions did not violate the First Amendment, 
because they served important interests in the preservation of local broadcasting, and the mul-
tiplicity of voices such broadcasters provide, and were not substantially more burdensome than 
necessary. Id. at 1203. 
84. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC. 114 S. Ct. at 2457. 
85. Id. at 2456-57. 
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have justified less freedom for broadcasters than for the print media.86 The 
Court, in an earlier opinion, stated that the scarcity rationale does not apply to 
cable television, because many more channels are available.87 Until Denver 
Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC. 88 addressed the 
indecency issue, the scarcity analysis provided the only hint as to whether the 
FCC's authority under Pacifica would carry over to cable. The Court clearly 
concluded that there- was a difference between the two media, but it was not 
clear what effect that difference would have. Lack of scarcity certainly 
undercuts the rationale for fairness and balance rules, such as the FCC 
regulations at issue in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC. 89 In Pacifica, 
however, the Court said that two of the complex reasons for lesser protection 
of the broadcast media were relevant.9o Scarcity was not one of the two, so the 
lack of scarcity in cable would not have necessitated a conclusion that 
Pacifica did not apply. 
B. Cable Television and the Denver Case 
The Denver case was a challenge to the constitutionality of portions of 
the Cable Television ACt.91 The relevant portions of the Act addressed the 
issue of indecent material on cable programming.92 - While broadcast 
television was limited by the sort of regulation approved in Pacifica, that 
decision was limited to over-the-air media.93 Material on cable is not covered 
by the regulations, and cable programming contains material that would be 
considered indecent under a Pacifica definition. Stronger language, more 
nudity, and more "adult situations," as well as more violence, are found on 
cable television, especially on premium motion picture channels and channels 
specifically aimed at an adult audience. 
Sections 10(a), lO(b), and lO(c) of the Act addressed potential cable 
sources of indecency, namely leased access and public, educational, and 
governmental access channels.94 Under federal law, cable operators are 
required to reserve a portion of their channels for lease to independent 
programmers, and the operators could not exercise any editorial control over 
86. Jd. Compare Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (discussing televi-
sion), with Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (involving the 
newspaper media). 
87. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. at 2457. 
88. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct 2374 (1996). 
89. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
90. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (stating the first reason as "the 
broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans," 
and the second as "broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to 
read."). 
91. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. at 2380. 
92. Jd. at 2382. 
93. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 750. 
94. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 47 U.S.C. §§ 
532(h), 532, 531 note (1994). 
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the content of the programs presented in the leased slotS.95 Public, 
educational, and governmental access channels (public access channels) are 
those provided by cable operators for such purposes, as a part of their 
franchise agreements with local governments.96 Sections lO(a) and 10(c) 
allowed cable operators to prohibit the broadcast, on leased access and public 
access channels respectively, of any programming the operator "reasonably 
believe[ d] described or depicted sexual or excretory activities or organs in a 
patently offensive manner. "97 Section 1 O(b) required cable operators that 
chose not to prohibit such programming to segregate it on a single channeJ.98 
That channel was to be blocked, unless a subscriber requested, in writing, that 
the signal be available.99 The operator then had thirty days to unblock the 
channel, and on a subsequent request to block, would have another thirty days 
to do SO.IOO Programmers would also have to provide thirty days notice to 
cable operators before presenting a patently offensive program. IOI 
When the case reached the United States Supreme Court, it resulted in 
six separate opinions.102 Justice Breyer's lead opinion was only a plurality 
opinion with regard to sections 10(a) and 10(c). Justice Breyer, joined in that 
portion of his opinion by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and Souter, concluded 
that section lO(a) was constitutional. 103 Justice Breyer recognized the 
extremely important government interest at stake in protecting children from 
being exposed to patently offensive sex-related materials, and that the Court 
had often found that interest compelling.104 Furthermore, the right given to 
cable operators by section 10(a) was one they would already have had, absent 
Congress's earlier ban on their exercise of editorial discretion. 105 Justice 
Breyer found the problem Congress addressed to be very similar to the 
problem presented in Pacifica and the balance struck by the section to be 
similar to that approved in Pacifica. 106 He also concluded that the section, 
because of its permissive nature, was less restrictive than the regulations at 
issue in Pacifica. 107 
95. See 47 U.S.C. § 532(b) (1994). 
96. See id. § 531(b). 
97. Id. § 532(h). 
98. Id. § 532(j). 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374 
(1996). 
103. Id. at 2381. 
104. Id. at 2386. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 2387. The Court found similarities to Pacifica in the facts that, like broadcast 
television, cable television was available to children, was also pervasive, also confronted the 
citizen in the privacy of his or her home with little to no prior notice and, as Pacifica noted, 
other sources for indecent materials were available to adults. Id. 
107. Id. 
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Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Ginsberg, dissented with regard to the 
constitutionality of section 10(a).I°s They considered the law setting aside 
leased access channels to have turned the cable operators into common 
carriers and concluded that such a requirement serves the same sort of 
function as the establishment of a public forum.l°9 The section would, 
therefore, have to meet strict scrutiny. I 10 They recognized the compelling 
interest in protecting children from indecency but found the section was not 
sufficiently tailored to that interest. I I I Children would not be protected, where 
operators choose not to ban indecent programming, and "[p]artial service of 
a compelling interest is not narrow tailoring."112 Furthermore, the approach 
went too far in protecting children; adults would also be deprived of the 
programming.113 
The remaining necessary votes for the judgment with regard to section 
lO(a) were provided by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and 
Thomas.114 They focused not on the First Amendment rights of 
programmers but of cable operators. lIS Because the section restored editorial 
control to the operators, there was no constitutional violation. I 16 
With regard to section lO(c), Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens 
and Souter, found important differences from section lO(a).1I7 While 
Congress restored editorial control in section lO(a), cable operators never had 
such control over public access channels. lls Public access channels were 
already subject to supervision by public, private, and mixed nonprofit 
groups.119 Local accountability provided a way to handle any indecency 
problems that might arise.120 Justice O'Connor did not see the importance of 
the distinctions offered and would have found section lO(c) constitutional on 
the same basis as section 10(a).121 The remaining Justices maintained their 
section lO(a) positions. A majority concluded that section lO(c) was 
unconstitutional.122 The majority was reached by adding the votes of Justices 
Kennedy and Ginsberg, who found the flaws of section lO(c) to be similar to 
those of section lO(a).123 Justices Thomas, Rehnquist, and Scalia, who again 
108. Jd. at 2404. 
109. Jd. at 2411. 
110. Jd. at 2416 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
Ill. Jd. 
112. Jd. (citing FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364,396 (1984». 
113. Jd. at 2416-17. 
114. Jd. at 2419 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
115. Jd. 
116. Jd. at 2424-25. 
117. Jd. at 2394-96. 
118. See id. at 2408. 
119. Jd. at 2394-95. 
120. Jd. at 2395. 
121. Jd. at 2403. 
122. Jd. at 2397, 2404. 
123. Jd. at 2404. 
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based their decision on the First Amendment rights of the cable operators, 
would have held section lO(c) constitutional,l24 
Fortunately, with regard to the section of the Act most important to the 
issue at hand, section IO(b), the Court issued a majority decision. The 
majority found fault with the thirty-day unblock and block requirements. 12S 
If a subscriber wished to watch a single program on the blocked leased access 
channel, he or she would have to request thirty days ahead of the program 
that the channel be unblocked.126 Those who select programs one day at a 
time or "surf' minute by minute, would not have access, unless they accept 
access all the time or at least four weeks in advance.127 The written request 
requirement for unblocking also raised the possibility that potential viewers 
would be chilled by the possibility of exposure because they requested the 
right to view indecent programming.128 The Court noted the costs and 
burdens of the blocking procedures and suggested that operators might be 
encouraged simply to ban programming they would otherwise have allowed, 
even if only as late hour programming. 129 
Despite these burdens on the presentation of protected material, the 
government sought to justify the statute as the least restrictive way of meeting 
the compelling objective of protecting children's physical and psychological 
well-being. 13o While the Court agreed that the government had presented a 
compelling interest, it held that the segregate and block provisions were not 
the least restrictive alternative nor sufficiently narrowly tailored. 131 The Court 
stated that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 contained alternatives that 
were less restrictive.132 While the Court did not determine whether the 1996 
provisions were constitutional, it did note the existence of requirements that 
programming on unleased channels primarily dedicated to sexually explicit 
programming be scrambled or, if the subscriber requests, blocked. \33 The V-
chip requirements of the Telecommunications Act were also noted as 
providing an automatic way to block the display of sexually explicit 
programs.134 If those provisions adequately protected children, it was unclear 
why more restrictive rules were required for protection from such 
programming on leased access channels.13S The Court could not find 
justification in the record: 
124. [d. at 2419. 
125. [d. at 2391. 
126. [d. 
127. [d. 
128. [d. 
129. [d. 
130. [d. at 2391. 
131. [d. 
132. [d. at 2392. 
133. [d. 
134. For a discussion of the V -chip, see infra notes 376-79 and accompanying text. 
135. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. at 2392. 
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[The record] does not explain why, under the new Act, blocking 
alone-without written access-requests--adequately protects children from 
exposure to regular sex-dedicated channels, but cannot adequately protect 
those children from programming on similarly sex-dedicated channels that 
are leased. It does not explain why a simple subscriber blocking request 
system, perhaps a phone-call based system, would adequately protect 
children from "patently offensive" material broadcast on ordinary non-sex-
dedicated channels (i.e., almost all channels) but a far more restrictive 
segregatelblocklwritten-access system is needed to protect children from 
similar broadcasts on what (in the absence of the segregation requirement) 
would be non-sex-dedicated channels that are leased.136 
13' 
Congress's willingness to use less restrictive means in a similar setting 
provided an indication that the more restrictive means were not necessary .137 
The Court also specifically addressed the possibility of using 
"lockboxes" to permit parents to lock out programs or channels they did not 
want their children to see.138 The FCC had found lockboxes less effective 
than the segregate and block provisions. 139 Parents would have to find out 
about the existence of such devices, buy and learn to program them, and be 
sufficiently vigilant to be sure that the programming they wish to block has 
been, and remains, locked out.140 While no provision can provide certain 
protection, the Court would not allow that fact to justify limiting viewing 
choices of the adult population to what is suitable for children. 
Before leaving Denver, it is worth reiterating several aspects of the 
opinion. The Court did recognize a compelling interest in protecting the 
physical and psychological well-being of children. Furthermore, the Court's 
analysis indicates that lockboxes or the V -chip provide less restrictive 
alternatives to that contained in section 10(b). The use of such devices may 
provide the necessary protection, without limiting the choices of adults.141 
C. The Internet and the Internet Cases 
The Internet is a large network of computers, each of which may be 
connected to other smaller networks of computers. Information may be 
passed to, or retrieved from, computers across the country and around the 
world using the network. There are over 9,400,000 computers linked together 
in the Internet, not counting home computers that can access the Internet 
136. [d. 
137. [d. 
138. [d. at 2393. 
139. [d. 
140. [d. 
141. Constitutional difficulties with the V-chip will be discussed infra notes 381-84 and 
accompanying text. Whatever the outcome of a challenge to the current mandated use of the V-
chip, the approach recommended in this Article does not raise the same issues. 
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through telephone line connections.142 It is estimated that as many as 40 
million people worldwide gain access to the Internet and that by the year 
1999, there will be 200 million Internet users.143 
There are various ways to communicate over the Internet.144 Electronic 
mail, or e-mail, allows individuals to place a message in a computer to be later 
accessed by the intended recipient.14s Similarly, messages may be sent to the 
e-mail addresses of all subscribers to a mailing list.146 In addition to e-mail 
communications, information may, instead of being sent to designated 
receivers, simply be stored on a computer accessible to Internet users.147 
USENET newsgroups fit this latter category.148 Messages are posted, and 
anyone who is interested may, without having to subscribe to a list, connect to 
the computer serving the newsgroup and access the information.149 There are 
also "chat rooms" in which all those connected to a particular server 
computer can post messages nearly simultaneously to each other, so rather 
than back and forth messaging, participants can engage in something more 
akin to a conversation.lso The Internet also allows for accessing and 
controlling other computers, either to engage them in computing or to 
retrieve information. lsl 
Perhaps the best known use of the Internet, to the point where many 
think of it as being the Internet, is the retrieval of information contained in 
files on computers throughout the world. The "World Wide Web" (the Web) 
serves this purpose. Various institutions, organizations, and individuals have 
established home pages with information about an entity, individual, or other 
information the publisher wishes to make available to the public. The 
information may contain material other than text, including still and motion 
pictures and audio samples. The pages will also often contain "links" to 
related home pages or to home pages the developer of the original page 
thinks the reader may also find interesting. Using a computer mouse to click 
on the highlighted link, the reader transfers directly to the linked document. 
The greatest difficulty in using the Web is finding the information. If 
the address, the "uniform resource location" or URL, is known, the Web site 
may be accessed directly.ls2 If the address is unknown, one of several 
available "search engines" is required. The user of such a program may 
142. Aa...U v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.n. Pa. 1996), affd, 117 S. Ct. 2329 
(1997). 
143. [d. 
144. [d. at 834-38. 
145. [d. 
146. [d. 
147. [d. 
148. [d. 
149. [d. at 834-35. 
150. [d. at 835. 
151. An example is accessing the computer catalog of a remote library and searching the 
library for books by a particular author. 
152. Not all Web sites are open to all who seek access. The publisher may choose to 
require the person seeking access to present a password or be denied access. 
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choose from a listing of categories of sites or may search for sites by entering 
key words. In either case, the search engine generates a list of possibly 
relevant Web sites. The list is actually a group of links allowing the user to 
access the sites. 
The Internet contains some sexually explicit material, although the 
proportion of Internet addresses containing such material is very small. 153 
Furthermore, with the exception that indecent material may be sent to a 
recipient's e-mail, some action on the part of the recipient is required, before 
he or she is exposed to indecent material. Most of the time, however, the user 
needs only to access the Internet address containing the material. The overt 
act involved does not need to be an intentional search for sexually explicit 
material. In the proceedings of Shea v. Reno,154 an expert ran a search using 
the titles of popular children's movies including Sleeping Beauty, Babe, and 
Little Women. 155 The search produced a small number of links to sexually 
explicit sites.156 
The concern that children would unintentionally stumble onto, or 
intentionally search out, indecent material has led to the development of 
several screening mechanisms. One such approach is the Platform for 
Internet Content Selection (PICS). PICS is an attempt by a- consortium of 
commercial and public interest entities interested in the Web. 157 Their goal is 
the development of technical standards that will support the development of 
equipment to allow parents to screen what their children can access. 158 The 
intent is to allow publishers and third parties to rate material in various ways 
and to provide parents a choice among rating services.159 Until the majority 
of sites have been rated, PICS will screen out all unrated sites. 16o The 
difficulty with this approach is that there are over 37 million separate sites on 
the Web. 161 Thus, until something in the neighborhood of 19 million sites 
have been rated, most will be screened out. The rated sites will most likely be 
those of commercial providers, and small Web publishers will be denied access 
to potential readers or viewers. 
A second screening approach is the development of screening software, 
several varieties of which are already on the market. 162 The software can work 
in several ways. One way is to have it contain a list of sites containing 
objectionable material and block access to those sites. The difficulty here is 
again the great number of sites, as well as the regular changes sites may 
153. See Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916,931 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (estimating the propor-
tion of sexually explicit material on the Internet to be well less than one-tenth of one percent). 
154. Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
155. [d. at931. 
156. [d. 
157. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 838-39 (E.D. Pa. 1996) affd, 117 S. Ct. 2329 
(1997). 
158. /d. at 838. 
159. [d. 
160. [d. at 839. 
161. Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. at 931. 
162. See id. at 932; ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 839-42. 
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undergo and the regular addition of new sites. 163 Furthermore, the trial 
expert's searches using "Babe" and "Little Women" as key words both 
turned up links to sexually explicit sites, even with screening software 
running. 164 Clearly, those sites were not listed. 
The software can also block all sites with URLs containing character 
strings such as "xxx" or "sex."165 While software can screen for sexually 
suggestive words or phrases, such screening may block too little or too much. 
A program instructed to block sites containing the word "breast" would 
screen out sites discussing breast cancer. There are very few sexually 
suggestive terms that do not also have nonsexual uses. The reason George 
Carlin found only seven terms you definitely could never say on radio was 
that other candidates for exclusion could be used in contexts that were 
nonsexual}66 Additionally, the software can screen only for text, leaving still 
or moving pictures unblocked}67 
In response to concerns that children would be exposed to Internet 
indecency, Congress passed the Communications Decency Act of 1996,168 as 
a part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.16.9 The Communications 
Decency Act amended 47 U.S.C. § 223(a), (d)}7o As amended, § 
223(a)(l)(B) provides in relevant part that any person who: 
(B) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly-
(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and 
(ii) initiates the transmission of, 
any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other 
communication which is obscene or indecent, knowing that the 
recipient of the communication is under 18 years of age, regardless 
of whether the maker of such communication placed the call or 
initiated the communication; 
163. Parents can subscribe to update services for SurtWatch and Cyber Patrol, two of the 
major software screening programs. See Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. at 932. This requires 
continued action on the part of parents in updating their programs. It may also be questionable 
whether the updates can keep up with the growth of Web sites, which have been said to be 
growing by as much as 700 per day. 
164. See id. 
165. See id. 
166. [d. at 934. 
167. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 842. 
168. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 1 33 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
169. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 11 0 Stat. 56 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). The Communications Decency Act is Title Vof 
the Telecommunications Act. 
170. [d. § 502, 110 Stat. at 133. 
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shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or 
both. 171 
Section 223(d)(1) makes it criminal to: 
(A) [use] an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or 
persons under 18 years of age, or 
(B) [use] any interactive computer service to display in a manner available 
to a person under 18 years of age, any comment, request, suggestion, 
proposal, image, or other communication that, in context, depicts or 
describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary 
community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs, regardless 
of whether the user of such service placed the call or initiated the 
•. 172 
commumcauon .... 
17 
It also became a crime for a person to "knowingly 
telecommunications facility under [his or her] control to be 
activity prohibited" by §§ 223(a)(l) and 223(d)(1).173 
[permit] any 
used for any 
, The statute also provided a defense: 
(1) No person shall be held to have violated subsection (a) or (d) of this 
section solely for providing access or connection to or from a facility, 
system, or ,network not under that person's control, including 
transmission, downloading, intermediate storage, access software, or 
other related capabilities that are incidental to providing such access or 
connection that does not include the creation of the content of the 
communication. 
(5) It is a defense to a prosecution under subsection (aXl)(B) or (d) of this 
section ... that a person-
(A) has taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate 
actions under the circumstances to restrict or prevent access by 
minors to a communication specified in such subsections, which 
may involve any appropriate measures to restrict minors from such 
communications, including any method which is feasible under 
available technology; or 
(B) has restricted access to such communication by requiring use of a 
verified credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult 
personal identification number. I 74 
171. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a)(1)(8) (West Supp. 1997). 
172. [d. § 223(d)(1). 
173. [d. § 223(a)(2), (d)(2). The statute also prohibited sending or receiving informa-
tion on abortions or abortion-inducing devices or drugs. That section was challenged by the 
ACLU, and the government did not contest the claim that the provision was unconstitutional. 
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824,829 (E.n. Pa. 1996), affd, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). 
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Congress recognized the potential for a constitutional challenge to 
various portions of the Act and provided for expedited review by a three-
judge federal district court, with a decision of unconstitutionality appealable, 
as a matter of right, to the Supreme Court.115 Challenge was, indeed, quick. 
The Act was signed by President Clinton on February 8, 1996; and on that 
very day, the ACLU filed an action in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania,116 and Joe Shea, the publisher of an 
electronic newspaper, filed an action in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New Y ork.l11 Both actions claimed that the statute 
violated the First Amendment and sought. injunctions against its 
enforcement.118 The opinion in ACLU v. Reno, was handed down on. June 11, 
1996,l19and the latter, Shea v. Reno, was delivered on July 29, 1996}80 
The ACLU v. Reno decision produced three separate opinions, each 
concluding that the act was unconstitutional on its face and that the injunction 
should be granted} 81 The lead opinion, authored by Chief Circuit Judge 
Sloviter, began its First Amendment analysis by determining that the statute 
had to meet strict scrutiny because it restricted non obscene, indecent material 
that enjoyed the protection of the First Amendment. 182 Judge Sloviter noted 
that the Internet seemed more akin to the telephonic communications at issue 
in Sable than to the broadcasts at issue in Pacifica, because the Internet user 
must deliberately retrieve specific information. 183 
Recognizing that it had to meet strict scrutiny, the government offered, 
as a compelling interest, the physical and psychological well-being of minors, 
174. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e). 
175. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223 note. 
176. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 117 S. Ct. 2329 
(1997). 
177. See Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
178. The action in ACLU v. Reno challenged 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a), (d). ACLU v. Reno, 
929 F. Supp. at 827. The New York litigation, on the other hand, was directed only at § 
223(d). Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp at 922. The Pennsylvania court did not distinguish the two 
sections in its discussion, but there appeared to be a strong argument that could be offered that 
the two should be treated differently. While the discussion in both cases centered on issues 
affecting the unconstitutionality of § 223(d), the analysis does not carry over to § 223(a) as 
easily as the Pennsylvania court's failure to distinguish the two would seem to indicate. The 
Supreme Court explained why both sections raised similar difficulties. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. 
Ct. 2329, 2350 (1997); see infra note 267 and accompanying text. 
179. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 824. 
180. Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. at 916. The Shea court considered the issues, despite 
the earlier findings and decision by the ACLU court. The Shea court noted that nonmutual col-
lateral estoppel against the government was not allowed, and that while the question of such 
estoppel with regard to questions of fact was not as clear, the tentative nature of the factual 
findings in the ACLU decision made estoppel as to factual issues inappropriate. [d. at 924. 
181. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 857, 864-65,883. 
182. [d. at 849. 
183. [d. at 851-52. 
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citing Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC184 and Ferber v. New York.'8S 
Judge Sloviter distinguished Sable and Ferber as situations where the harm to 
children was more evident and in which there was no valuable content, as is 
found on the Internet.'86 That material could have value even for older 
minors, and the First Amendment rights of older minors merit protection. 187 
While Judge Sloviter lacked confidence in the government's position that 
there was a compelling interest in regulating the vast range of material on the 
Internet, she did acknowledge that there was an interest in shielding a 
substantial number of minors from some of the Internet material Congress 
had addressed and, therefore, determined not to rest her position on the lack 
of compelling interest.188 
Even with a compelling interest, Judge Sloviter found the statute uncon-
stitutional because it swept too broadly and chilled the free expression rights 
of adults. 189 She found clear evidence that many Internet publishers would 
find it technically or economically impossible to comply with the Communi-
cation Decency Act, other than by limiting the posting of material that adults 
had a constitutional right to access. 190 Newsgroups, listservs, and chat rooms 
have no way to screen for age, so the level of communication would have to 
be reduced to that appropriate for minors.191 Judge Sloviter found that even 
on the Web, noncommercial publishers would find it too expensive and bur-
densome to verify age in the way the government suggested. l92 Again, 
publishers would be forced to choose between prosecution under the Act or 
limiting the material made available to that suitable for minors, thereby 
affecting the rights of adults to obtain nonobscene material. 193 
Finally, Judge Sloviter addressed the government's contention that the 
statutory defenses available provided narrow tailoring, thereby saving the 
statute. 194 Judge Sloviter responded: 
[I]t is difficult to characterize a criminal statute that hovers over each 
content provider, like the proverbial sword of Damodes, as narrow tailoring. 
184. Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (upholding a 
prohibition on the possession and distribution of child pornography). 
185. Ferber v. New York, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (upholding a prohibition on the 
possession and distribution of child pornography). 
186. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 852-53. 
187. [d. at 853. As examples of valuable material that might be patently offensive in 
some communities, Judge Sioviter offered the text of the Broadway play Angels in America, 
with its portrayal of homosexuality and AIDS, travel magazine photographs of sculptures of 
copulating couples from ancient monuments in India, and Francesco Clemente's painting 
Labirinth. [d. at 852-53. 
188. [d. at 853. 
189. [d. at 854-55. 
190. [d. at 854-56. 
191. [d. at 854. 
192. [d. 
193. [d. at 855. 
194. [d. 
HeinOnline -- 46 Drake L. Rev. 20 1997-1998
20 Drake Law Review [Vol. 46 
... No provider ... is likely to willingly subject itself to prosecution for a 
miscalculation of the prevalent community standards or for an error in 
judgment as to what is indecent. A successful defense to a criminal 
prosecution would be small solace indeed.195 
Credit card requirements and adult verification were seen as infeasible, and the 
defense of "good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions under 
the circumstances to restrict or prevent access by minors" was inadequate, 
even if "effective" required less than 100% effectiveness, because the neces-
sary technology was not available,l96 The only government suggestion of 
technology was a tagging scheme, under which a character string would be 
included in all indecent material.197 That scheme, however, had not been 
established and would also depend on the cooperation of third parties to 
block the material so identified.198 Lastly, even if the technology develops, 
the burden on publishers would be significant because they would have to 
review all material they make available to insure that it would not be 
considered patently offensive in some community,l99 
. The second opinion, authored by Judge Buckwalter, primarily addressed 
vagueness issues.2oo Judge Buckwalter expressed concern over the lack of 
definition for the term "indecent. "201 While the government argued that it 
was, for purposes of the statute, synonymous to "patently offensive," he 
found that to be no help to a publisher attempting to comply with the Com-
munications Decency ACt.202 He rejected Pacifica and Sable as precedent for 
a conclusion that the terms were not unconstitutionally vague, because neither 
case ruled on that issue.203 He did, however, recognize that the Ninth Circuit, 
in Information Providers' Coalition v. FCC,204 read Pacifica and Sable as 
implicitly accepting the FCC definition of telephone indecency as '" the 
description or depiction of sexual or excretory activities or organs in a pat-
ently offensive manner as measured by contemporary community standards 
for the telephone medium."'205 The Information Providers' Coalition court 
had also concluded that such a definition was no more vague than the defini-
195. [d. at 855-56. 
196. [d. at 856. 
197. [d. 
198. [d. 
199. [d. Judge Sloviter also agreed with Judge Buckwalter's argument that "indecent" 
and '),atently offensive'~ are inherently vague. [d. See infra notes 200-10 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of Judge Buckwalter's argument. 
200. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 857-64. 
201. [d. at 858. 
202. [d. 
203. [d. at 862. 
204. Information Providers Coalition v. FCC, 928 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1991). 
205. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 862 (quoting Information Providers Coalition v. 
FCC, 928 F.2d at 874). 
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tion of obscenity announced by the Court in Miller v. California.206 Judge 
Buckwalter also acknowledged other opinions upholding the use of the term 
"indecent" in telephone and television cases.207 He found notable, however, 
that in the telephone and television cases the FCC had defined "indecent" as 
patently offensive under community standards for the particular medium.208 
The Communications Decency Act provision did not define the applicable 
community as that of cyberspace.209 While the Conference Report on the 
Communications Decency Act stated that the Act was intended to establish a 
national standard, publishers would have difficulty discerning the community 
standard and would be chilled into not publishing work with serious value.2lo 
The third opinion was by Judge Dalzell. He also expressed concern that 
any regulation of indecency limits access for adults and must be justified 
under strict scrutiny.211 With regard to the argument that "indecent" was too 
vague a term, Judge Dalzell found adequate precedent for the conclusion that 
the term, as a shorthand for the "patently offensive" provision, was not 
unconstitutionally vague.212 What led him to conclude that the Act was 
unconstitutional was a "medium specific analysis" of its proscriptions.213 He 
began by noting the differential treatment afforded the various media, under 
United States Supreme Court decisions· addressing print, broadcast media, 
cable television, and billboards.214 
Of the media that the Supreme Court had already considered, the gov-
ernment, in attempting to justify the Communications Decency Act, relied on 
Pacifica.2ls Judge Dalzell, however, found little guidance in that case, stating 
that "[t]ime has not been kind to the Pacifica decision. Later cases have 
eroded its reach, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed against 
overreading the rationale of its holding."216 He cited three cases for his con-
clusion.217 The first, Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.,218 did indeed 
206. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,25 (1973); see ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 
862. 
207. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 862 (citing Dial Info. Servs. v. Thornburgh, 938 
F.2d 1535 (2d Cir. 1991); Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 
1991». 
208. [d. 
209. [d. at 862-63. 
210. [d. at 863 (referencing S. CONF. REP. No. 104-230, at 191 (1996». 
211. [d. at 866. 
212. [d. at 868-70. 
213. [d. at 872. 
214. [d. at 873-74 (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994) 
(regarding cable television); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) 
(regarding billboards); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (regarding 
print media); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (regarding broadcast radio and 
television». 
215. [d. at 874. 
216. [d. at 875. 
217. [d. at 875-76. 
218. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983). 
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note the narrowness of the Pacifica holding in refusing to extend the interest 
in protecting children from indecent material to justify a ban on the mailing 
of unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives.219 But as noted earlier, the 
distinction between Pacifica and Bolger was in the lesser intrusiveness and 
greater control over exposure to the content of mail.22o The second case, 
Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 22 I also refused to rely on Pacifica, but 
again, the difference between the media was in intrusiveness and assault on the 
unsuspecting and unwilling listener.222 The third case, Turner Broadcasting 
System, Inc. v. FCC,223 also limited Pacifica.224 In Turner, the distinction was 
not based on intrusiveness but on the lack of the scarcity that justified certain 
broadcast regulations.225 Judge Dalzell took Turner as "confirm[ing] beyond 
doubt that the holding in Pacifica arose out of the scarcity rationale unique to 
the underlying technology of broadcasting," because cable is no less intrusive 
or more uniquely accessible to children than broadcast television.226 The lack 
of scarcity distinction in Turner, however, did not speak to the basis for Paci-
fica but rather to the fairness issues of Red Lion.227 It is a mistake to conclude 
that, because of Turner, Pacifica is inapposite.228 It would also be a mistake to 
conclude thClt Pacifica automatically dictates the result in a consideration of 
the Communications Decency Act. Thus, while Turner does not deserve the 
effect Judge Danzell gave it, he is right in looking to a media specific analysis. 
Continuing on that analytic path, Judge Danzell found four characteris-
tics of the Internet that have "transcendent importance" to holding that the 
Communications Decency Act is unconstitutional:229 
First, the Internet presents very low barriers to entry. Second, these 
barriers to entry are identical for both speakers and listeners. Third, as a 
result of these low barriers, astoundingly diverse content is available on the 
Internet. Fourth, the Internet provides significant access to all who wish to 
speak in the medium, and even creates a relative parity among speakers.230 
219. [d. at 73. 
220. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text. 
221. Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). 
222. [d. at 128. 
223. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994). 
224. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824,876 (B.D. Pa. 1996) (citing Turner Broad. Sys., 
Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. at 2457), aff'd, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). 
225. [d. 
226. [d. 
227. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text. 
228. The majority portion of Denver mentioned Pacifica but declined to determine the 
extent to which Pacifica does or does n'ot apply a lower standard of review to indecent speech. 
Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2391 (1996). The 
issue of Pacifica's application outside of the broadcast media was left open. Furthermore, in its 
analysis of section 10Ca), the plurality in Denver drew guidance from Pacifica in its analysis of 
cable indecency. See id. at 2386-87. 
229. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 877. 
230. [d. 
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With regard to those characteristics, the Act was seen as undermining the 
speech enhancing effects of the Internet and skewing the parity among speak-
ers that exists on the Internet.23I While Judge Danzell was willing to accept 
the protection of minors from pornography as a compelling governmental 
interest, the Act would lead to the intolerable result of reducing the speech on 
the Internet available to adults. Furthermore, this result would occur, without 
accomplishing the government's goal in shielding children because a signifi-
cant portion of Internet communications originate outside the United 
States.232 
In contrast to ACLU v. Reno, Shea v. Reno produced a single opinion. 
The Shea court began by addressing the vagueness issue. The court took 
Pacifica's determination that the broadcast at issue was indecent under 
essentially the same definition as used in the Communications Decency Act, 
indicating that the definition of "indecent" was not unconstitutionally vague 
and noted that other courts had so read Pacifica.233 The court also concluded 
that the "patently offensive" standard was not unconstitutionally vague, 
thereby disagreeing with two of the judges in the ACLU v. Reno decision.234 
While the statute does call for an assessment of the offensiveness of the 
material in context, context has always been a component of indecency 
analysis, and the phrase "in context" simply follows the approach of 
Pacifica. The court said, "We cannot see how importing certain language 
that has been used by various courts considering challenges to the definition 
of indecency renders the Communications Decency Act unconstitutionally 
vague. "235 
The failure to identify the community in which the material would be 
found patently offensive also did not make the statute unconstitutionally 
vague. The court said that "in light of the fact that modem communications 
have long transcended community borders, this problem is not a novel 
one."236 The court went on to quote Sable for the proposition, "'If [the 
provider's] audience is comprised of different communities with different 
local standards, [the provider] ultimately bears the burden of complying with 
the prohibition of obscene messages. "'237 The plaintiffs sought to distin-
guish Sable, however, on two bases: First, while commercial entities may have 
the staff to monitor FCC pronouncements on offensiveness in communities 
across the country, small Internet providers would lack that capacity. 238 Addi-
tionay' while telephone communication might be limited to communities that 
the provider chooses to serve, Internet providers cannot limit the geographic 
231. /d. at 878. 
232. /d. at 882. 
233. Shea v. Reno. 930 F. Supp. 916,935-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
234. [d. at 936. 
235. [d. 
236. [d. 
237. [d. at 937 (quoting Sable Communications. Inc. v. FCC. 492 U.S. 115. 125-26 
(1989». 
238. /d. 
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area from which an audience can gain access.239 The court was not persuaded 
by the first point, stating "We have no basis for concluding that Internet 
content providers are any less capable than those subject to obscenity laws or 
other indecency restrictions to acquire a general familiarity with the relevant 
standards . . . . "240 On the second point by the plaintiffs-the claim that 
inability to control the community in which messages would be received 
would require that content be geared toward the least tolerant community-
the court concluded that the issue raised was one of overbreadth rather than 
vagueness and proceeded to consider that issue.241 
The court first determined that any overbreadth would have to meet 
strict scrutiny.242 The plaintiff offered two overbreadth arguments. The first 
argument was that the Communications Decency Act reached a significant 
amount of material with serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.243 
Secondly, the statute is not narrowly tailored because it limits the ability of 
adults to engage in protected communication by effectively banning all inde-
cent communication on the Internet.244 Because the court agreed with the 
second argument, it did not address the first. 245 
The court began by noting that, if the statutory proscription stood alone, 
it would be unconstitutionaP46 Because Internet users do not know that the 
content they provide will not reach minors, they will be chilled in their expres-
sion and will only offer material suitable for minors.247 The statute, however, 
provides two defenses. First, the restriction of access by requiring the use of a 
credit card or access code.248 Second, taking "good faith, reasonable, effec-
tive, and appropriate actions under the circumstances" to prevent access by 
minors, including any method feasible under available technology.249 If the 
239. [d. 
240. [d. 
241. [d. at 938. The court failed to find any significance in the fact relied on by two of 
the judges in the ACLU v. Reno case that the statute did not rest on the community standards for 
the particular medium. [d. It found that no courts had focused on any of the references in other 
statutes or regulations to community standards for a particular medium, therefore basis did not 
exist for a claim that Pacifica or its progeny required such a reference. [d. 
242. [d. at 940. While the plurality in Denver had not explicitly applied strict scrutiny 
to the regulations at issue, the Shea court concluded that the reason for Denver's choice of 
standard" had been the pervasive and intrusive nature of cable television and the lack of adequate 
warning of the content being broadcast. [d. In contrast, Internet reception requires affirmative 
steps, like the telephonic communications in Sable, and does not assault the listener without 
notice. [d. 
243. [d. 
244. [d. 
245. [d. 
246. [d. at 941. 
247. [d. 
248. [d. at 942-43 (citing 47 V.S.C.A. § 223(e)(5)(B) (West Supp. 1997)); see also 
supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
249. Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. at 943-47 (citing 47 V.S.C.A. § 223(e)(5)(A) (West 
Supp. 1997)). 
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defenses would allow adult-to-adult communication of indecent material 
without facing criminal liability, the statute as a whole would be narrowly tai-
lored to the government's compelling interest in restricting access by minors 
to patently offensive material and would not be unconstitutionally 
overbroad.25o 
The court first considered the defense that the provider had required a 
verified credit card or adult access code. With regard to e-mail type commu-
nication, including listservs, the court saw no way for the sender to insure that 
the recipient was an adult.251 Senders of e-mail are often individuals with no 
means to verify a credit card number. Similarly, newsgroup servers and chat 
room services may wish to allow anonymous access to files and conversations. 
Even if anonymity were not important, newsgroups, listservs, and chat room 
hosts do not have profits from which to pay for credit card verification. The 
Web is the one context in which credit card information is required with any 
regularity. Some commercial providers of Web content do charge for their 
services by requiring a credit card number before allowing access to their 
material. The court found, however, the category of commercial provider 
elusive and it was not clear that all publishers that might be considered 
commercial providers could absorb the costs of requiring and verifying credit 
cards.252 
The good faith defense fared no better. While the Conference Report 
on the Communications Decency Act indicated that "effective," as it relates 
to the prevention of access by minors, did not mean 100% effective,253 the 
court concluded that the defense was unavailable unless there existed reasona-
bly effective means of blocking access.254 "[The statute] does not by its 
terms allow content providers to escape liability if there is no feasible and rea-
sonably effective way of limiting minors' access to those 
communications."255 The only two means suggested by the government were 
both lacking in availability and effectiveness.256 
The first suggestion was "tagging" the name or address of sites con-
taining indecent content.257 The goveTJlment contended that evidence of 
tagging, "'coupled with evidence that the tag would be screened by the mar-
ketplace of browsers and blocking software,'" would meet the requirements 
of the defense.258 Simply placing a tag in the address or title, however, would 
itself accomplish nothing because there is no generally accepted tag require-
ment that browsers or blocking software manufacturers may use to block 
250. [d. at 942. The court had already assumed that the interest in preventing minors 
from being exposed to indecent material was compelling. 
251. [d. 
252. [d. at 943. 
253. S. CONF. REP. No. 104-230, at 190 (1996). 
254. Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. at 943. 
255. [d. 
256. [d. at 942-50. 
257. [d. at 944. 
258. [d. (quoting a letter written and filed with the court by John C. Keeney, Acting 
Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice). 
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sites.259 Providers might include a label, such as "xxx" or "sex," which 
already trigger blocking software; however, such a step might not satisfy the 
statute, because blocking software is not widely used.260 Although the 
government introduced evidence that there are browsers capable of 
recognizing certain tags, other browsers are not so capable, and tagging 
cannot, therefore, be considered reasonably effective.261 
The government's other suggestion was that providers of indecent con-
tent place their material in directories blocked by screening software.262 This 
suggestion suffered similar infirmities. Here, too, there was no evidence that 
products that would block such directories have a significant market, share.263 
The government suggested that adults wishing to engage in indecent 
communication could do so in fora with limited access, but the court again 
noted that there was no way for the manager of such a limited forum to be 
sure of the age of a subscriber.264 While possession of a credit card might be 
required as an indication of age, the cost of verifying the credit card number 
would be too high for non commercial providers.265 Because current tech-
nology did not make the statutory defenses feasible, the defenses were 
unavailing and the statute failed to be narrowly tailored.266 
When the ACLU v. Reno case reached the United States Supreme Court, 
the Court had little difficulty agreeing, in a relatively short opinion, that the 
Communications Decency Act was unconstitutionaP67 The Court adopted 
the undisputed facts agreed on by the participants in the 'Pennsylvania action 
and then went on to consider the following three cases relied on by the gov-
ernment:268 Ginsberg v. New York,269 FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,27o and 
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.271 The Court saw the actions behind all 
three cases as significantly different from and significantly more narrow than 
the actions at issue in the Communications Decency Act.272 With regard to 
Ginsberg, the Court noted that, although the statute at issue had limited the 
exposure of minors to certain sexual materials,273 the statute did not bar 
parents from exposing their own children to such material, applied only to 
commercial transactions, did not address material that had value for minors, 
259. [d. at 945. 
260. [d. 
261. [d. 
262. [d. at 946. 
263. [d. at 947. 
264. [d. 
265. [d. at 943. 
266. [d. at 949-50. 
267. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2334 (1997). 
268. [d. at 2341. 
269. Ginsberg v. New York. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
270. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
271. Renton v. Playtime Theatres. Inc .• 475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
272. Reno v. ACLU. 117 S. Ct. at 2341-42. 
273. Ginsberg and its "obscene as to children" doctrine will be discussed infra notes 
346-68 and accompanying text. 
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and applied to minors under seventeen, rather than the eighteen years 
provided for in the Communications Decency Act.274 
As for Pacifica, the Court noted that it had targeted a specific, nontradi-
tional program to determine only when, rather than if, it was permissible to air 
such material; that is, it concerned channeling rather than a ban.27s The Court 
also saw the action in Pacifica as a declaratory order rather than a punitive 
action.276 Lastly, the Court noted that the medium that had been the subject 
of regulation in Pacifica was one that had been afforded the most limited First 
Amendment protectionP7 
With regard to Renton, a case that upheld zQning regulations limiting 
the location of adult movie theaters, the Court noted that the ordinance had 
addressed the secondary effects of such theaters, rather than the content of the 
films.278 While the Government tried to characterize the Communications 
Decency Act as "cyberzoning," the Court said that the Act applies to all of 
cyberspace, rather than only to certain neighborhoods.279 Furthermore, since 
the purpose behind the Act was the protection of children from the primary 
effects of indecency, the Act was content based.28o The precedents relied on 
by the government, therefore, failed to support the ACt.281 
The Court then addressed concerns over ambiguities in the Act.282 One 
part of the Act addressed "indecent" material, while another section 
addressed material that depicts or describes sexual or excretory activities or 
organs in a way that is "patently offensive as measured by contemporary 
community standards. "283 The lack of a statutory definition for either the 
term or the phrase, combined with the different language used in the two sec-
tions, was seen likely to lead to uncertainty among potential speakers as to 
how the standards relate to each other and what they mean.284 Such vague-
ness in a content-based regulation, with criminal sanctions, was said to be 
unacceptable because of the chilling effect it would have on protected 
speech.285 
In addition to vagueness concerns, the Court concluded that the Act 
would have the effect of suppressing a great deal of speech that adults have 
274. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. at 2341. 
275. [d. at 2342. 
276. [d. 
277. [d. 
278. [d. 
279. [d. at 2347. 
280. [d. at 2342. 
281. [d. at 2343. 
282. [d. at 2344. 
283. [d. 
284. [d. 
285. [d. The government claimed that the statute was no more vague than the obscenity 
standard presented in Miller v. California, but the Court responded that Miller requires that the 
depiction of acts subject to sanction be specifically defined by statute. [d. at 2345 (citing 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,25 (1973». 
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the constitutional right to send to and to receive from other adults.286 Such an 
effect is unacceptable, where there are less restrictive alternatives, even accept-
ing the governmental interest in protecting children from harmful 
materials.287 Even the prohi6itions on sending indecent material, knowing the 
recipient to be a minor, would have an unacceptable effect because if one 
member of a chat room is a minor, the conversation of all the adult partici-
pants would be Iimited.288 The Court was also troubled by the community 
standards aspect of the regulation and the effect it would have of limiting the 
content of the Internet to that acceptable in the least tolerant community and 
by the potential application of the Act to parents whose views of what is 
appropriate for their children might differ from that of the community.289 
Given the alternatives discussed in the briefs and presentations of the parties 
and the lack of congressional findings or hearings on alternatives, the Court 
could not find that the Communications Decency Act was narrowly tai-
lored.29o The Court further stated that the statutory defenses could not save 
the Act.291 The Court agreed with the lower court's analysis of the defenses as 
unavailable or economically unfeasible.292 
The Court then addressed the government's fallback position that the 
unconstitutional portions of the Act should be severed to leave intact any con-
stitutionally permissible provisions.293 The only portion of the Act the Court 
found severable was the term "indecent" in section 223(a).294 By removing 
the word indecent, the section would then ban the transmission only of 
obscene material to a recipient known to be under eighteen.295 The 
remaining provisions of the Communications Decency Act could not be saved 
by such "textual surgery. "296 
In addition to the majority opinion, there was also an opinion by Justice 
O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, concurring in the judgment in 
part and dissenting in part.297 Justice O'Connor agreed with the Court with 
regard to its concerns over the Act's effect on adult accessibility to protected 
material but wrote separately to explain her view that the Communications 
Decency Act was "little more than an attempt by Congress to create 'adult 
zones' on the Internet [and that] precedent indicates that the creation of such 
zones can be constitutionally sound."298 Nonetheless, she saw the Communi-
cations Decency Act as having failed to meet the requirements for such 
286. [d. at 2346. 
287. [d. 
288. [d. 
289. [d. at 2347. 
290. [d. at 2333. 
291. [d. 
292. [d. at 2349. 
293. [d. at 2350. 
294. [d. 
295. [d. 
296. [d. 
297. [d. at 2351 (O'Connor, l., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
298. [d. 
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zoning laws because it would unduly restrict access by adults.299 Justice 
O'Connor did note the progress being made in screening software, tags on the 
addresses of indecent material, and the PICS project.300 She suggested that 
the development of such technology would make cyberspace more like the 
real world and, therefore, more amenable to a zoning law approach.301 
Nonetheless, the Act must be assessed against the background of available 
technology, and the only way to avoid liability currently is to refrain 
completely from indecent speech.302 
Justice O'Connor also broke with the majority in its refusal to either 
accept or reject the contention that the Act unconstitutionally interfered with 
the First Amendment rights of minors,303 based on Ginsberg's recognition 
that minors may be denied access to material protected for adult consumption 
but deemed obscene as to minors.304 Although the Act might reach some 
material that is protected even as to minors, Justice O'Connor was not 
convinced that there was the real and substantial overbreadth required to 
prevail on a facial challenge to a statute.30S Instead, Justice O'Connor 
believed that there would be little that was patently offensive but not obscene 
as to minors.306 
m. REsURRECTING THE REGULATION OF INDECENCY 
A. General Considerations 
1. The Lessons of Denver and Reno 
There is guidance to be drawn from the Denver and Reno cases. Proba-
bly most important is that, in the effort to protect children from the effects of 
indecent material, adults must not be limited in the nonobscene material they 
may access, at least not to a degree greater than is necessary. This lesson is 
not new. It is, in fact, the conclusion reached in Butler v. Michigan. 307 But, it 
should be clear from the later cases that Butler reaches beyond outright bans 
on qtaterial that might be harmful to minors and includes restrictions that . 
unduly affect the availability of material to adults based on harm to minors. 
A second,· related lesson is that any defenses that are offered in an 
attempt to narrowly tailor the statute to the interest in protecting minors must 
299. [d. at 2353. 
300. [d. at 2354. 
301. [d. at 2353. 
302. Justice O'Connor also addressed the issue of knowingly transmlttmg indecent 
material to a minor. [d. She would have upheld the law as it applies to adult transmission of 
such material when the sender knows all the recipients are minors; however, she would not 
have upheld the law in the chat room context in which some minors are present. [d. at 2355. 
303. [d. at 2356. 
304. [d. at 2353. Ginsberg will be discussed infra notes 346-58 and accompanying text. 
305. Reno v. ACLU. 117 S. Ct. at 2356-57. 
306. [d. at 2356. 
307. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text. 
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not be too burdensome on publishers or program providers. If the cost 
involved is sufficiently large as to be unbearable by small or noncommercial 
publishers, the speech of those publishers will be chilled to a level appropriate 
for minors. Adults will be left without a forum or source of speech that they 
have a constitutional right to utter or access. If the statutory defense is 
technological, the technology must be relatively inexpensive and readily 
available or the development of such technology must be mandated. 
There are also propositions from the foregoing cases which would pro-
vide tempting lessons. One such candidate is the positive comments offered 
in that part of Denver's majority opinion regarding the V-chip. In looking at 
narrow tailoring of the segregate and block provision at issue, the Court noted 
that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 contained alternatives that were less 
restrictive.308 The Court pointed to requirements in the Act that programming 
on cable channels primarily dedicated to sexually explicit programming be 
scrambled or, if requested by the subscriber, blocked.309 The Court also 
noted that the V -chip requirement of the Act was a less restrictive way of 
blocking sexually explicit programming.310 It is tempting to conclude that 
requiring scrambling and the V -chip are, therefore, constitutional, but the 
Court did not so rule.311 
The Communications Decency Act mandated the creation of the V-
chip.312 All televisions with a diagonal screen size of thirteen inches or 
greater, manufactured after a date set by the FCC, but no later than two years 
after the passage of the Act, are required to contain such a chip, on penalty of 
being banned from shipment in interstate commerce.313 The chip will be 
designed to detect a signal that will accompany the broadcast of violent 
programming.314 If parents activate the chip, the television will not display 
any program accompanied by the signal.315 The Act also calls for the crea-
tion of a Television Rating Code by an advisory committee to be named by 
the FCC.316 The name of the chip makes it sound like it is aimed solely at 
violence, however, the rating system is broader. The Act calls for guidelines 
and procedures for identifying and rating programming with sexual, violent, 
or other indecent content.317 Any programming that has been so rated may 
be broadcast, but only if accompanied by the signal that will allow parental 
blocking.3I8 
308. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2392 
(1996). 
309. [d. 
310. [d. 
311. [d. 
312. 47 U.S.C.A. § 303 note (West Supp. 1997). 
313. [d. §§ 303(x). 330(c). 
314. [d. § 303(x). 
315. /d. 
316. [d. § 303(w). 
317. [d. § 303(w)(I). 
318. [d. § 303(w)(2). 
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The advisory committee is to be composed of "parents, television 
broadcasters, television programming producers, cable operators, appropriate 
public interest groups, and other interested individuals from the private sector 
and is [to be] fairly balanced in terms of political affiliation, the points of view 
represented, and the functions to be performed by the committee."319 The 
advisory committee is required to submit a final report of its recommenda-
tions within one year from the date of the appointment of its first members, 
but there is a provision under which the broadcast industry might forestall 
action by the committee.32o The advisory committee provisions do not take 
effect until one year from the passage of the Act, and even then: 
(1) ... only if the Commission determines, in consultation with appropri-
ate public interest groups and interested individuals from the private 
sector, that distributors of video programming have not, by such date-
(A) established voluntary rules for rating video programming that con-
tains sexual, violent, or other indecent material about which 
parents should be informed before it is displayed to children, aIXI 
such rules are acceptable to the Commission; and 
(B) agreed voluntarily to broadcast signals that contain ratings of such 
programming.32I 
Thus, if broadcasters establish their own rating system, and that system is 
satisfactory to the FCC, the committee will not develop its own ratings system. 
There are serious arguments that the V -chip legislation may be uncon-
stitutional. Some of those arguments are limited to the V -chip requirements 
for violent material,322 but others are directed at the entire scheme.323 The 
requirement that televisions contain V -chips would seem to raise no 
constitutional difficulty. The statute is merely an exercise of the power to 
regulate interstate commerce and simply restricts the interstate shipment of 
televisions failing to meet the specifications set. It would also seem that the 
implementation of a rating system by the broadcasters themselves would not 
raise a constitutional issue. However, that may not be as clear as it seems. 
During the 1970s, in an effort to limit children's exposure to sexually ori-
ented or violent material, the chair of the FCC met with the three major 
television networks and suggested that material not suitable for young chil-
319. [d. § 303(w)(1). 
320. [d. 
321. [d. § 303 note. 
322. See generally Harry T. Edwards & Mitchell N. Berman, Regulating Violence on 
Television, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1487 (1995) (questioning the constitutionality of attempts to 
regulate television violence and suggesting that ratings aimed at helping parents may be 
acceptable); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., Televised Violence: First Amendment 
Principles and Social Science Theory, 64 VA. L. REV. 1123 (1978) (stating that content based 
regulation of television violence is unconstitutional). The ability to regulate violent images 
may not be as broad as whatever capacity exists to regulate sexually indecent materials. 
323. See infra notes 376-79 and accompanying text. 
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dren be scheduled only after 9:00 p.m. and be accompanied by wamings.324 
Each network then developed the sort of programming guidelines that had 
been discussed, as did the National Association of Broadcasters.~25 Shortly 
thereafter, a group of television writers and production companies challenged 
the guidelines in federal court.326 The court declared the plan unconstitu-
tional.327 In the court's view, the FCC had pressured the networks and the 
National Association of Broadcasters into adopting the policy. The adoption 
of the policy, under such pressure, was held to be a' violation of the First 
Amendment.328 While the court would have allowed truly voluntary plans on 
the part of broadcasters, the adopted plans had not been voluntary.329 If the 
networks adopt a ratings system pursuant to the V -chip legislation, that might 
also be seen as involuntary. 
If the networks fail to establish a satisfactory ratings system and the FCC 
attempts to impose its own ratings, the clearly involuntary ratings will certainly 
be challenged.33o Ratings may be seen as the very sort of licensing require-
ments that the prohibition on prior restraints was designed to prevent.33I That 
denial of licensing authority and of prior restraints is at the very core of the 
First Amendment.332 One may respond by arguing that ratings are not 
licenses, but the legislation would require that one form of protected 
expression go through a regulatory framework to which others are not 
exposed. This discrimination among forms of protected speech, even on 
grounds of offensiveness, is not constitutionally permissible.333 One may 
argue that the burden imposed by ratings is less than that imposed by the 
channeling requirements approved in Pacifica. Even if that were true, if rat-
324. Writers Guild of Am. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1072 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (citing 
National Association of Broadcasters, THE TELEVISION CODE, 2-3 (18th ed. 1975». 
325. [d. . 
326. [d. 
327. [d. at 1161. 
328. [d. at 1072. 
329. The court also found antitrust law problems in the agreement of the National 
Association of Broadcasters and networks to limit broadcasts. [d at 1143. The antitrust 
aspects were addressed years later, when Congress granted an antitrust exception for 
discussions among the networks aimed at reducing televised violence. See The Television 
Program Improvement Act of 1990, 47 U.S.C. § 303(c) (1994). 
330. Actually, the Telecommunications Act fails to direct the imposition of the FCC 
panel's ratings system. See infra notes 378 and accompanying text. 
331. See J.M. Balkin, Media Filters, the V-Chip, and the Foundations of Broadcast 
Regulation, 45 DUKE L.J. 1131, 1158-64 (1996). 
332. See generally Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (stating that historically 
the chief purpose of First Amendment protection as it applies to the press is the prevention of 
prior restraints). 
333. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (holding that a city 
ordinance prohibiting the showing of films containing nudity, including nonobscene nudity, 
on drive-in screens visible from the street is unconstitutional); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 
IS (1971) (holding that a nonobscene but offensive message on the back of a jacket was 
constitutionally protected). 
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ings are seen as working as a form of prior restraint, they may be more 
burdensome than the later imposed penalties for a failure to channel. 
The United States Supreme Court in Reno v. ACLU also referred to 
various technological approaches which would allow parents to block material 
they find objectionable.334 The majority did not hold that the requirement of 
such blocking technology would be constitutional. Instead, the Court used 
the potential availability of technology to argue that the approach employed 
by Congress was not narrowly tailored.335 While that might be read as indirect 
approval of such an approach, without an examination of the issues it raises, 
the dictum should probably not be read too strongly. Justice O'Connor and 
Chief Justice Rehnquist seemed to provide somewhat more explicit approval 
for screening. Justice O'Connor discussed screening software and PICS and 
said that once they are sufficiently developed to be effective and available, 
they would make cyberspace amenable to the zoning that has been allowed in 
the physical world.336 
Given these arguments against imposed ratings and the fact that the 
Supreme Court did not rule in either case on these provisions of the 
Telecommunications Act or an equivalent approach to Internet ratings, it may 
be a mistake to rely too heavily on the simple references of the Court to those 
provisions as being less restrictive. A rating system in which the producers or 
publishers of programs and Internet material rate their own offerings would 
seem less problematic than government ratings, so long as the rating is volun-
tary. However, the continued debate on television ratings indicates that only 
public pressure is likely to lead to adequate ratings in that medium. The 
Internet, lacking whatever control licensing provides for the broadcast media, 
is likely to present even greater difficulties in obtaining publisher cooperation 
in ratings. Clearly, incentives will be required, but any incentives to rate must 
be consistent with the Constitution and must not impose penalties on speech, 
rated or unrated, that is constitutionally protected.337 
It is also unclear how much weight should be given to the Denver 
majority's reference to scrambling and blocking. While the commercial 
providers of cable programming have the technological ability and the capital 
necessary to scramble signals, scrambling might be a substantial burden on 
noncommercial or small Internet publishers. Furthermore, a requirement that 
they scramble indecent material, without the market having a uniform system 
of de scrambling, would raise the same sort of chilling problems that troubled 
the courts in the Internet cases. 
334. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329,2336-37 (1997). 
335. [d. at 2348. 
336. [d. at 2353-54 (O'Connor, I., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
337. Such incentives could be positive incentives or penalties based on the dissemina-
tion of unprotected material. Requirements and penalties directed at protected material would, 
of course, have to be justified under a heightened scrutiny standard. 
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2. Obscenity as to Children 
The approach to be suggested here, for indecency on all the electronic 
media, is based on the theory of variable obscenity. The obscenity exception 
to the First Amendment was recognized in Roth v. United States. 338 The 
current test for obscenity, as stated in Miller v. California,339 asks: 
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community stan-
dards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient 
interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive 
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and 
(c) whether the work, taken as a :-vhole, lacks serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value.340 
Variable obscenity is an approach to obscenity law that takes into account the 
audience to which the material is distributed.341 The theory originated with 
Professors Lockhart and McClure, as a suggestion for addressing concerns 
over the exposure of adolescents to materials aimed at adults.342 If such mate-
rial is not obscene, it is protected when distributed to adults, but that does not 
mean that distribution to minors is also protected. Variable obscenity allows 
consideration of the audience in detennining whether material is obscene and 
prohibiting the distribution of obscene material to that particular audience. 
The Supreme Court recognized the concept of variable obscenity in Mishkin 
v. New York. 343 The Court held that, for material designed for and distributed 
primarily to a sexually deviant group, the proper test for the "appeal to the 
prurient" interest requirement was the prurient interest of the deviant 
group.344 Even material that had no such appeal to the average person could 
be obscene as to the intended and likely target group.345 
338. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
339. Miller v. California. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
340. [d. at 24 (citation omitted). 
341. Given the varying degrees of protection afforded the various media. it may seem 
odd to offer one approach for application to several media. Where that approach. however, is 
one that has served ~o limit the protection of the most protected media. the print media, its 
application to other media. whether or not they merit less protection, is reasonable. Whether 
the media are easily seen as distinct, as had been the prevailing theory, has also been called 
into question. See Thomas Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., Converging First Amendment 
Principles/or Converging Communications Media, 104 YALELJ. 1719, 1722 (1995). In an 
era where the Internet comes into the home over phone lines, where the telephone company 
and cable distributors are competitive, where broadcast media are delivered by cable. and where 
the newspaper is delivered electronically, the old distinctions may have lost their value. 
342. William B. Lockhart & Robert C. McClure. Censorship 0/ Obscenity: The 
Developing Constitutional Standards. 45 MINN. L. REV. 5,85 (1960). 
343. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966). 
344. [d. at 508. 
345. [d. at 509. 
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Variable obscenity, as applied to youth, was recognized by the United 
States Supreme Court in Ginsberg v. New York.346 Ginsberg had been con-
victed of selling "girlie magazines," containing pictures of female nudity, to 
a sixteen year old boy. 347 The New York courts had held the sales to be in 
violation of a New York law making it a crime "knowingly to sell . . . to a 
minor ... any picture ... which depicts nudity, sexual conduct or sado-maso-
chistic abuse and which is harmful to minors."348 The ban also extended to 
"explicit and detailed verbal descriptions or narrative accounts of sexual 
excitement, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse and which, taken as a 
whole, is harmful to minors."349 The statute also provided several definitions. 
"Nudity" was defined as: 
the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic area or buttocks 
with less than a full opaque covering, or the showing of the female breast 
with less than a fully opaque covering of any portion thereof below the top 
of the nipple, or the depiction of covered male genitals in a discernibly 
turgid state.3SO 
"Sexual conduct" was defined as "acts of masturbation, homosexuality, sex-
ual intercourse, or physical contact with a person's clothed or unclothed 
genitals, pubic area, buttocks or, if such person is a female, breast."3sl The 
statute defined "harmful to minors" in a way that made it consistent with the 
contemporaneous test for obscenity: 
"Harmful to minors" means that quality of any description or representation, 
in whatever form, of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or sado-
masochistic abuse, when it: 
(i) predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest 
of minors, and 
(ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community 
as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors, and 
(iii) is utterly without redeeming social importance for minors.3s2 
Turning to the constitutional analysis of the statute, the Supreme Court 
first noted that the magazines at issue were not obscene when sold to adults,3s3 
346. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,638-39 (1968). 
347. Id. at 631. 
348. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484-h(2)(a) (1965). Section 484-h of the New York Penal Law 
is reprinted in full in the Ginsberg opinion. See Ginsberg v. New York. 390 U.S. at 645-47, 
app. A. The Supreme Court also cited obscenity statutes from thirty-five states containing 
provisions regarding distribution to minors. See id. at 647-48. app. B. 
349. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484-h(2)(b) (1965). 
350. Id. § 484-h(1 )(b). 
351. Id. § 484-h(1 )(c). The statute also provided definitions for "sexual excitement" and 
"sado-masochistic abuse." See id. 
352. Id. § 484-h(1)(f). 
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and that the appellant did not argue that the magazines did not meet the 
statutory definition of "harmful to minors."354 Thus, the only real issue was 
the availability of a different standard for obscenity, when material is distrib-
uted to minors.355 The Court concluded that the statute did not intrude on 
whatever freedom of speech the Constitution grants to minors.3s6 A state has 
the power to regulate for the well-being of its children, both in support of 
parents in their upbringing of their children and based on the state's own 
interest in the character of its youth.357 Thus, the only remaining question, 
according to the Court, was whether or not the legislature could rationally 
conclude that exposure to the restricted materials would harm youth.358 
The legislature had included in the statute a finding that the material 
condemned was '''a basic factor in impairing the ethical and moral develop-
ment of our youth and a clear and present danger to the people of the 
state. "'359 While the Supreme Court expressed doubt that this finding was an 
accepted scientific fact, it did not require that the finding be scientifically 
established.36o Because obscenity is unprotected by the First Amendment, it 
could be suppressed without establishing such a basis.361 The Court simply 
had to determine that "it was not irrational for the legislature to find that 
exposure to material condemned by the statute is harmful to minors."362 The 
Court then looked to the scientific studies available and concluded that, while 
a causal link between obscenity and the impairment of ethical and moral 
development had not been established, neither had such a link been 
disproved.363 Because the materials were unprotected, the Court refused to 
require '''scientifically certain criteria of legislation'" and was unwilling to 
353. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,634 (1968). 
354. [d. at 643. 
355. /d. at 634-35. There was also a challenge based on vagueness, but the Court noted 
that the statutory definition matched the requirements' for defining adult obscenity as then 
presented in Memoirs v. Massachusetts. [d. at 643 (citing Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 
U.S. 413,418 (1966». 
356. [d. at 638. The majority in Reno v. ACLU found fault with the government's reli-
ance on Ginsberg, because the Communications Decency Act failed to protect material with 
value for minors and did not allow parents to provide minors such inaterial. Reno v. ACLU, 
117 S. Ct. 2329, 2341 (1997). It is with regard to the first of these issues that Justice 
O'Connor broke with the majority. She believed the amount of material covered by the Com-
munications Decency Act, but still having value for minors or not appealing to their prurient 
interests, to be rather small. [d. at 2356 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
357. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. at 640. 
358. [d. at 641. 
359. [d. (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484-e (1965». 
360. [d. 
361. [d. 
362. [d. 
363. [d. at 641-42. 
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find a lack of a rational basis for the conclusion that such materials harm 
minors.364 
The importance of this decision is the relationship between what was 
taken to be obscene as to youth and what is defined to be indecent in the 
electronic media context. The FCC's definition of indecent cable program-
ming reaches "programming that describes or depicts sexual or excretory 
activities or organs in a patently offensive manner as measured by contempo-
rary community standards for the cable medium."365 The New York statute 
at issue in Ginsberg would appear to reach most, if not all, of the FCC regula-
tion's target, and with less concern over vagueness.366 The nudity and sexual 
activity aspects of the statute, coupled with the "harmful to minors" require-
ment, address patently offensive depictions of sexual organs or activities. 
While depictions of excretory organs and activities were not within the pro-
hibitive scope of the statute in Ginsberg, the standard presence of such 
prohibition in obscenity statutes generally, and the Supreme Court's approval 
of its inclusion,367 would indicate that their inclusion in a statute aimed at 
banning the distribution of obscene material to minors does not raise a con-
stitutional problem. The only additional change that should be made would 
actually enlarge the scope of a statute like that in Ginsberg. The third prong 
of the "harmful to minors" definition, the "utterly without redeeming social 
importance for minors" clause, should be updated to reflect the Miller test's 
requirement that material should be protected, if it, taken as a whole, has 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.368 This 
requirement should address the Court's concern that material with value for 
minors would be barred. 
364. [d. at 643 (quoting Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 110 (1911». 
365. 47 C.F.R. § 76.701(g) (1996). 
366. It is possible that certain language, such as that at issue in Pacifica, may not be 
obscene, even as to youth. Depending on how the language is used, however, and the 
youthfulness of the audience, it could be within the scope of the proposed statute. 
367. The Court in Miller, explained that "plain examples of what a state statute could 
define for regulation under part (b) of the standard . . . [include] [p]atently offensive 
representations or descriptions of ... excretory functions." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 
25 (1973). The Supreme Court majority in Reno v. ACLU did find fault with the 
Communications Decency Act's inclusion of excretory activities and sexual and excretory 
organs, but only in the context of a discussion of vagueness compared to the Miller 
requirement that the subject matter of the depictions be specifically defined by applicable law. 
See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2344-45 (1997). The Court also noted that Miller was 
limited to sexual conduct. [d. This may just be a call for greater specificity in any future 
restrictions. It may also, however, be simply a reiteration of the requirement that the depiction 
appeal to the prurient interest. If that is so, it must be remembered that provocative nude 
poses, as defined in Ginsberg, were sufficient to appeal to the prurient interest of youthful 
viewers. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. at 632, 636. 
368. Under this prong, material containing nudity or sexual content might still be pro-
tected. If the material has serious value for minors, then despite its sexual content, it is not 
obscene as to children. 
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There is no reason why Ginsberg should be limited to print media. 
Obscenity law itself extends to electronic communications. Judge Dalzell, in 
ACLU v. Reno, conceded that the government could punish the distribution of 
obscene material on the Internet,369 as did the United States Supreme Court 
majority implicitly in its Reno v. ACLU decision.37o Indeed, convictions for 
operating computer bulletin boards containing obscene materials have been 
upheld.371 The only plausible argument that would distinguish Ginsberg 
would be a claim that in distributing magazines to adults, it is easier to avoid 
distributing magazines to minors, than it would be to selectively distribute 
electronic media. That argument, backed up by the Butler decision, makes 
clear the importance of relying on existing or mandated methods of screening 
that do not impose a heavy burden on distributors. 
B. Resuscitating Cable Regulation in the Wake of Denver 
The concern over cable indecency that gave rise to the statute partially 
struck down in Denver can be addressed by a statute guided by the holdings 
in Denver, Ginsberg, and Butler. Such a statute would go beyond the 
regulation contained in the Cable Television Act. That act requires that inde-
cent or sexually explicit programs on cable channels dedicated primarily to 
sexually oriented programming be scrambled so that nonsubscribers do not 
receive them.372 If such channels are not scrambled, the programming must 
be channeled into hours when children are less likely to be watching.373 Even 
assuming that those requirements are constitutional,374 they do not address 
indecent programming on cable channels not primarily dedicated to sexually 
oriented programming. It is also less than clear that, under indecency analy-
sis, the provisions are constitutional. Broadcast indecency rules, under the 
rationale of Pacifica, may carry over to cable. But, if scarcity and public 
ownership of the airwaves are necessary to Pacifica, cable may not be subject 
to the same rules.375 
Programming on channels not primarily dedicated to sexually oriented 
programming would be affected by the V-chip portions of the Telecommuni-
cations Act. Although most of the publicity over the V-chip has centered on 
the control of violent programming, the V -chip also has the capability of 
blocking sexually explicit programming, if it is accompanied by the signal 
369. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 865 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 117 S. Ct. 2329 
(1997). 
370. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. at 2350. The Court severed the word "indecent" from 
section 223(a), saying it could then leave the rest-the proscription on knowingly 
transmitting obscene material to minors-standing. 
371. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 701-02 (6th Cir. 1995) cert. 
denied, 117 S. Ct. 74 (1996) (holding that the intangible nature of Internet material did not 
preclude prosecution for interstate transportation of obscene materials). 
372. 47 U.S.C.A. § 560 (West SUpp. 1997). 
373. [d. 
374. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text. 
375. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
HeinOnline -- 46 Drake L. Rev. 39 1997-1998
1997] Electronic Indecency 39 
required to activate the chip.376 The rating system to be developed by 
distributors of video programming would include ratings based on sexually 
explicit content, and for any programming so rated, the rating must be 
transmitted with the program.377 It is, however, unclear whether V-chip rat-
ings will be assigned to all programming. While the advisory committee will 
develop a rating system, if the distributors fail to provide a satisfactory system, 
implementation is not guaranteed. 
Left unclear [in the statute] is whether the Commission would be em-
powered to require that broadcasters accept the advisory committee's rating 
system. Also left unclear is whether the FCC would have the power to 
insist that all programming be rated before it can be broadcast. The fail-safe 
provision is left deliberately toothless to avoid constitutional problems of 
prior restraint and compelled speech.378 
While public opinion may be sufficiently strong with regard to network pro-
gramming and sufficiently effective when brought to bear against local 
affiliates as to lead to ratings, that opinion might not carry over as strongly to 
cable providers. The constitutional and implementational difficulties 
potentially faced by the V-chip regulations make it unwise to rely solely on 
their protection.379 
The alternative statute proposed here would criminalize the intentional, 
knowing, or reckless distribution to minors of cable programming that is 
obscene as to minors.38o The responsibility would not be on the cable system 
operator. Instead responsibility would be on the programmer. Programmers 
could show whatever material they like, but if the material is distributed to 
minors, and the programmer was at least reckless in that distribution, the 
programmer would be criminally liable. 
To survive a constitutional challenge this approach provides the pro-
grammer with a viable defense. The defense is similar to the defense rejected 
in the Reno cases as unavailable.381 It is, however, available here. Congress 
has already mandated that all televisions manufactured after a certain date 
contain a V -chip. Cable programmers, therefore, should be allowed a defense 
if their programming is accompanied by a signal which would trigger the 
chip. While all material obscene as to youth would not necessarily be blocked 
376. See supra notes 309-10 and accompanying text. 
377. 47 U.S.C.A. § 303. 
378. Balkin, supra note 331, at 1157-58. 
379. See supra notes 322-28 and accompanying text. 
380. In Reno v. ACLU the United States Supreme Court distinguished Ginsberg on 
several grounds. One such ground was that the statute in Ginsberg defined minors as persons 
under 17, while the Communications Decency Act defined minors as those under 18. Reno v. 
ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2341 (1997). While the distinction might not be dispositive, it 
would be more prudent to limit the application of the statute to making such materials available 
to those under 17. 
381. See id. at 2349-50; Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 943-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); 
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 846-49 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). 
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from youthful viewers, because parents may not immediately replace their old 
televisions with V -chip equipped models, a statute like that in Ginsberg does 
not always prevent minors from obtaining sexually indecent printed material. 
If parents keep indecent printed material for their own use, they must decide 
how diligently to keep such materials away from children. Likewise, parents 
who have (;able television should exercise similar, or even greater, diligence.382 
Premium cable channels, such as movie channels, that require an extra 
viewing fee should not be exempt from penalties. While such channels are 
scrambled for those not paying for the service, the same is true of cable gen-
erally. Only those who pay have the service. Providers such as HBO, 
Cinemax, and Showtime know that households with children obtain their 
services. Indeed, they schedule programming aimed at young audiences bu t 
generally restrict their less child-appropriate fare to later hours. Not accom-
panying adult programming with a V -chip signal would, given the knowledge 
that. subscriber households contain children, be reckless. 
To convict, actual distribution to a minor would be required; that is, the 
prosecutor would have to show that a minor either stumbled on to, or affirma-
tively tuned in to, material that is obscene as to children. The same is, of 
course, true with a charge of distributing obscene printed material to children. 
The lengths to which cable programmers are asked to go are also no greater 
than are expected for the print media.383 Stores that sell magazines not 
obscene and intended for adult purchasers, stock those magazines behind the 
counter or place them in sealed plastic bags prohibiting access to children.384 
Accompanying the cable broadcast by a signal seems no more burdensome. 
382. Given Ginsberg's reliance on state's power to help parents control the access their 
children have to sexual material and the Supreme Court's concern in Reno v. ACLU that the 
penalties of the Communications Decency Act would apply to parents transmitting indecent 
material to their children, (such as disseminating birth control information to their seventeen-
year-old college freshman child or allowing their children to access such material on a home 
computer) the parental control aspect of the approach suggested here is critical. Reno v. 
ACLU, 117 S. Ct. at 2348. 
383. Programmers may, in fact, face a lesser burden. A seller of printed material might 
incur liability for the sale of material, obscene as to children, to a mature-looking minor and 
may even be set up to face such liability. Under the approach suggested here, a minor cannot 
be purposely exposed to material as a way to establish liability. Failure to purchase or use a 
television with a V -chip or the failure to activate the chip does not lead to liability for the pro-
grammer. It is only the failure to include a signal resulting in a minor's exposure that would 
lead to prosecution. 
384. A recent Ninth Circuit decision upheld a statute that required new limitations on the 
methods of distribution to prevent exposing minors to indecent material. Crawford v. Lun-
gren, 96 F.3d 380, 382 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, I 17 S. Ct. 1249 (1997). The court found 
no constitutional violation in a California statute banning the sale of "harmful matter" from 
unsupervised, sidewalk vending machines, unless identification cards or tokens issued by 
someone who checked the purchaser's age were required. [d. at 385-89. The court did not argue 
that the potential distribution to minors meant that the material was unprotected. Instead, the 
court held that the statute mer strict scrutiny, based on the statute's narrow tailoring to the 
compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of children. [d. 
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This approach avoids the need of governmental pre-screening and rat-
ing of material to be presented. It is the programmer that makes the original 
decision as to the nature of the program material. That programmer chooses 
whether or not to include the signal. It is true that the penalty for being 
wrong may be a criminal conviction and the accompanying penalties of such 
a determination. But again the same is true for a merchant who chooses 
whether or not to allow a minor to buy a particular publication. There may 
be some chilling effect on the speech of cable programmers, but the effect is 
minor. The broadcaster will not be chilled in broadcasting the material, but 
merely into being overly cautious in accompanying its programming with the 
signal. Adult access should be unaffected. 
With regard to effects on the First Amendment rights of minors, again it 
is only material obscene as to minors that is prosecutable. While some addi-
tional material may be chilled, the situation is again no different from that for 
the other media or for material obscene as to adults. Merchants may refuse 
minors access to non-obscene printed material out of caution. Similarly, 
publishers of materials aimed at adults may stay farther away from the line 
marking obscenity than is necessary using the same caution. The United 
States Supreme Court has been willing to accept the possibility that some 
speech bordering on obscenity-material that is at the periphery of the First 
Amendment-may be chilled.38s The situation should be no different here. 
The criticism that indecency regulations ignore children's First 
Amendment rights by not exempting material with serious value for children 
is also addressed.386 Material which, taken as a whole, has serious literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific value for minors is not obscene as to youth. 
While there may again be an objection that providers are forced to anticipate 
whether such value will be found, the argument is the same for the print media 
and for material aimed at adults. Furthermore, if parents decide that their own 
children, particularly children almost at the age of majority or mature beyond 
their years, would find serious value in a program that might not have such 
value for the average child, the parent can deactivate the V-chip, either per-
manently or on a show-by-show basis .. The final decision on viewing for each 
child is ultimately made by his or her parents. The cable provider is forced 
only to provide parents the means to control their children's viewing. 
385. Language expressing lesser concerns is found in Pacifica. See FCC v. Pacifica 
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 (1978). The language was in the plurality portion of the opinion, 
but cited Bates v. State Bar and Young v. American Mini Theatres as support. Jd. (citing Bates 
v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976». 
While the concurrence by Justice Powell, joined by Justice Blackmun, specifically objected to 
the theory that the Court could determine what speech is more or less valuable, he did concur in 
a judgment that would have a chilling effect. Jd. at 760. Justice Powell did so because of the 
characteristics of the broadcast media and the need to protect children---characteristics and a 
need similar to those found in the context under present consideration. Jd. at 757-61. 
386. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 863-64; see also Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. at 
2348 (finding it unnecessary either to accept or reject the contention that the Communications 
Decency Act violated the First Amendment by restricting material with value for minors). 
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The last potential difficulty to be addressed is the community within 
which prurient appeal and patent offensiveness are to be assessed. It may be 
acceptable not to define the community. In Sable, the United States Supreme 
Court noted the constitutionality of bans on telephonic communication of 
obscene material, even though the statute did not define the community.387 
The Court denied that the failure ran afoul of the "contemporary community 
standards" requirement of Miller.388 The statute at issue was seen as no more 
establishing a national standard for obscenity than federal statutes barring 
shipping obscene materials through the mail. If distributors distribute materi-
als to communities with different standards, they must ascertain the 
community standards for each community.389 
Cable broadcasts seem to be sufficiently similar to the phone communi-
cation in Sable. Broadcasters know what communities they are serving and 
can investigate the standards of those communities. Providers with limited 
resources are likely to be small and perhaps local providers with a smaller 
investigative task. Furthermore, it would seem likely that there would be 
somewhat less variation from community to community with regard to what 
appeals to the prurient interest of children or is offensive when displayed to. 
children as compared with adult audiences.39o 
C. Re-Regulating the Internet 
The approach to regulating material available on the Internet should be 
quite similar to that of printed media, allowing certain changes in the available 
defenses because of the technological differences between the two media. As 
with television, ca~le, or print, obscene material may be proscribed. Judge 
Dalzell, in his opinion in ACLU v. Reno, conceded that "the Government 
could punish these forms of speech [obscenity and child pornography] on the 
Internet even without the [Communications Decency Act]. The Government 
could also completely ban obscenity and child pornography from the 
Internet. "391 Similarly, the Supreme Court majority in Reno v. ACLU, held 
that by severing the ban on knowingly transmitting indecent material to 
minors from section 223(a) of the Communications Decency Act, it could 
leave the parallel ban on obscene material standing.392 Just as there is no 
reason why obscenity law should not apply to the Internet, there is no reason 
why the doctrine of obscenity as to children should not apply. Again, the 
purposeful, knowing, or reckless distribution to minors of materials obscene 
as to children can be criminalized, just as in the statute at issue in Ginsberg. 
But again, adult access to material not obscene as to adults must not be 
restricted. There must be reasonable ways available in which publishers may 
387. Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124-26 (1989). 
388. See id. 
389. [d. at 125-26. 
390. See infra notes 402-07 and accompanying text (for a discussion of the differences 
regarding the Internet community, and other aspects of this issue). 
391. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 865 (citation omitted). 
392. Reno v. ACLU, 1 I7 S. Ct. 2329, 2350-51 (1997). 
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pro.tect themselves and no.t be chilled into. limiting the materials they publish 
to. tho.se fit fo.r children. 
The key is to. mandate the availability o.f the defenses, suggested but 
fo.und unavailable in the Internet cases. Much o.f the ratio.nale o.f the Reno 
o.pinio.ns was based o.n the inability o.f Internet publishers to. limit the distribu-
tio.n o.f the material they pro.vide. The implicatio.n was that narro.w tailo.ring 
wo.uld be met if pro.viders co.uld easily and inexpensively ado.pt o.ne o.f the 
verificatio.n o.r screening appro.aches that were included in the statute, o.r 
explicatio.n o.f the statute, as defenses. Because the techno.lo.gy was 
unavailable, the defense was also. unavailable, and the statute was effectively 
o.verbro.ad in that publishers wo.uld be chilled into. pro.viding o.nly what was fit 
fo.r children. 
The Reno Co.urts, the Supreme Co.urt, and bo.th District Co.urts, each 
no.ted the develo.pment o.f PICS by a co.nso.rtium o.f Web publishers.393 PICS 
wo.uld allo.w tags to. be attached to. Internet addresses which wo.uld pro.vide 
electro.nic ratings. "When the system is fully implemented, PICS-co.mpatible 
client so.ftware (including browsers, newsgro.up readers, and mail readers), 
Internet service pro.viders, and co.mmercial o.n-line services will be able to. 
detect PICS tags and blo.ck co.ntent based o.n ho.w a parent has co.nfigured the 
so.ftware. "394 Just as Co.ngress had mandated that all televisio.ns manufactured 
in the future must co.ntain a V -chip, Co.ngress co.uld require that all bro.wser 
so.ftware and all mail and newsgro.up reader so.ftware co.ntain PICS. As with 
the V-chip, it wo.uld be the parents' prero.gative to. co.nfigure the so.ftware to. 
blo.ck material acco.mpanied by the signal. 
Once PICS is mandated, the inclusio.n o.f a PICS signal wo.uld co.nstitute 
a defense to. the distributio.n to. mino.rs o.f material o.bscene as to. children. But, 
each publisher o.f Internet material wo.uld be liable fo.r the purpo.seful, kno.w-
ing, o.r reckless distributio.n to. mino.rs o.f material o.bscene as to. children. 
Such o.bscenity wo.uld be defined as it was in the statute at issue in Ginsberg, 
but with co.mmunity standards defined relative to. the Internet medium. As 
with cable, an actual distributio.n wo.uld ,be required; that is, so.me mino.r must 
have accessed material o.bscene as to. children. Again, ho.wever, a defense 
wo.uld be that"the publisher attached the PICS signal. 
With regard to. e-mail and listserv messages, the so.ftware used to. write 
and send messages sho.uld be required to. provide a cho.ice as to. whether the 
message transmitted sho.uld be made available to. mino.rs. The best appro.ach 
wo.uld be to. have a default setting that limited the message to. adults and/o.r 
no.n-PICS-activated receivers. The sender co.uld to.ggle o.ff the limitatio.n, if 
the sender intended to. make the material available to. children. This wo.uld 
reduce the negligent transmissio.ns o.f such material by senders who. failed to. 
to.ggle o.n the PICS tag, in a system where the default po.sitio.n allo.wed access 
by mino.rs. This wo.uld eliminate the co.ncern expressed in the Supreme 
Co.urt's Reno v. ACLU o.pinio.n that the inclusio.n o.f a single mino.r in a chat 
393. See id. at 2354; Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916,932 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); ACLU v. 
Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 838. . 
394. Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. at 932. 
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room, or on a mailing list, would limit the speech of all participants.395 
Participants may still offer any indecent, non-obscene speech, but must 
accompany the message with a PIes signal. Minors using PIeS-activated 
computers would not receive the message, but adults and minors whose 
parents allow their children to receive such material would still have access. 
The Web presents an additional difficulty. The publisher of a Web page 
should be liable for distribution to minors of material obscene as to children 
that appears on that page, just as any other publisher is so liable, unless a PIeS 
signal is attached. Web pages, however, commonly contain hypertext links to 
other pages, and those other pages often contain links to still other pages. If 
the publisher of a Web page is to be held responsible for all information that 
could be linked from the publisher's page, there would be a substantial 
chilling effect. The only way in which a publisher could assure itself of 
protection would be to provide no links. Links, however, are often the best 
way to find the material the browser is seeking. Once one relevant site is 
found, that site's links to other sites are extremely valuable. While a list of 
relevant sites could replace the links as access tools, the need to key in the 
URL addresses of those related cites would make access more difficult and 
time consuming.396 
Fortunately, it is not necessary to make a Web publisher responsible for 
all linked sites. If the publisher links to another site originating in the United 
States, that site is also subject to the requirements of the proposed statute.397 
That site, if it contains material obscene as to children, will be required to 
contain a PICS activating electronic tag. If the site does not contain such a 
tag, the publisher will be criminally liable for children's exposure to prohib-
ited material. Publishers whose own sites are not PIeS activating and who link 
to the site should be allowed to rely on those other publishers adhering to the 
law and be allowed the defense. The only exception should be if the govern-
ment can prove a scheme in which a publisher purposely links to a site it 
knows to be both obscene and not PIeS activating with the intent to make that 
site available to children.398 
There are also, however, a significant nuinber of sites that originate out-
side the United States. Those sites would not be subject to the statute 
requiring PICS tags for material obscene as to children, and a publisher could 
395. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. at 2355. 
396. Search engines create not only a list of potentially relevant sites, but also a collec-
tion of links. The ability to then browse the linked sites quickly for relevance is much of what 
makes the search engine valuable. A system in which only a list was generated, and in which 
the user had to key in the URLs, would be cumbersome and would limit the usefulness of the 
Web. 
397. The URLs of United States sites can be identified by certain suffixes, such as "edu," 
"com," or "org." Foreign sites have suffixes indicating the country of origin, such as "uk" for 
the United Kingdom. . 
398. If a publisher that would for some reason be difficult to prosecute were to establish 
a non-PICS activating site containing obscene material, other more easily prosecutable pub-
lishers should not be allowed the opportunity intentionally to flout the law by linking to those 
sites through their own non obscene sites and making obscene material available. 
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not rely on their inclusion of a PIeS tag if their material were obscene as to 
children. If United States publishers were strictly liable for the material in 
foreign linked sites, there would again be a chilling effect. Non-PIeS acti-
vated sites-sites believed to have value for children-would likely be 
unwilling to link to foreign sites, and children would lose the international and 
multi-cultural benefits the Internet can provide. The better approach is to 
allow the government to prosecute for links· to a foreign site only if it can 
prove that the site was obscene at the time the United States provider included 
it as a link. The United States publisher is then under a duty to view any site 
to which it links and, if that site contains material obscene as to children, 
attach a PIeS tag to its own page. If the foreign linked site later adds material 
that is obscene as to children, the United States page publisher should only be 
liable, if it becomes aware that it is now linking to a non-PIeS activating but 
obscene as to children site.399 Additionally, the United States publisher that 
links to a foreign site should be responsible only for that site. If the foreign 
site links to additional sites, the United States publisher need not attach a PIeS 
activating tag based on the material on those second, or greater, level of links, 
unless the United States publisher knows that they contain material obscene as 
to minors. That is, the duty to investigate foreign sites, before linking them to 
a United States non-PIeS activating site, extends only to the first level of 
links.4oo 
This still leaves open the possibility that a foreign site containing mate-
rial that is obscene as to children might be accessed, not as a link from a Web 
page, but as the result of a Web search. This is, of course, technically con-
necting through a link, because the list that results from a search is a list of 
links. It would seem to be unreasonable, however, to require that those con-
structing search engines and providing browser services examine every page 
to which they provide a link. The browser software will already be required to 
have the capacity to block, if parents wish, all sites not including a signal that 
they are fit for children. Any foreign sites then accessed would have to be 
sites that have decided to make themselves available to children, but some for-
eign page publisher might choose to include material that is obscene as to 
399. An alternative would be to require that all software that will contain PIeS tag iden-
tification be set to exclude all material without a tag indicating no obscenity rather than 
excluding material that is tagged as being obscene as to children. But, the effect of such an 
approach would be that children, whose parents have activated the PIeS screen, would not be 
able to access foreign sites, unless those sites decided voluntarily to include a PIeS non-
obscene tag. 
400. If a foreign site managed to obtain a URL with a suffix indicating United States 
origin, a link to that site should be protected, unless the publisher knows the site contains 
material obscene as to children. This provides an example of how a failure to attach the PIeS 
tag would still not subject the publisher to liability. The publisher would not have been 
reckless in allowing access to what was believed to be a United States site itself subject to the 
statute. 
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children and still not include the PICS activating tag.401 The solution to this 
potential problem is for the browser software also to provide parents an option 
under which searches will be limited to United States sites. Those sites will be 
subject to the statute and the sites to which they link will also either be subject 
to the statute or will have been checked by the publishers of the initial sites 
providing the links. It is, of course, possible that foreign sites with value will 
be inaccessible, but parents who wish their children to have access to such sites 
may choose not to activate the United States limitation on searches, just as 
they may allow their children to use the Internet with no PICS screening at all. 
This PICS based approach puts the onus on the sender or publisher. It 
eliminates the massive, perhaps undoable task of the government or an inde-
pendent board examining and providing ratings for millions of Web sites. It 
also brings within the scope of regulation e-mail. and newsgroups. Further-
more, it does so in a way that does not prevent adults from communicating 
with, or providing information for, each other. The publisher or e-mail 
sender must determine whether or not the material being provided is obscene 
as to minors and may be liable if mistaken, but that is the same as it is for dis-
tributors of print material. Print distributors can still distribute indecent 
material to adults, while being careful to refuse to provide minors material that 
is obscene as to children. Electronic publishers and e-mail senders may also 
communicate indecent material to adults, but must be careful not to provide 
minors with material obscene as to children. The proposed defenses spell out 
what constitutes care. The level of care required, including a PICS tag or 
examining foreign linked sites, seems minimal. The burden would seem no 
greater than the seller of indecent magazines requesting evidence of age from 
one who purchases such a magazine. 
Here, too, there may be concern over the community within which pru-
rient appeal and patent offensiveness are to be assessed. Again, as in Sable, it 
may be acceptable not to define the community, or a standard based on the 
Internet community may be acceptable.402 The statute at issue in Sable was 
not seen as establishing a national standard for obscenity to any degree 
greater than federal statutes barring mailing obscene materials.403 With the 
Internet, however, arguments based on requiring the sender to know the stan-
dards of the community into which depictions are sent and to be judged by 
that standard, lose force. Material on the Internet is accessible everywhere, 
and publishers will face either a national standard or the standards of any 
community in which charges are filed. 
It is interesting to note that the original community standards require-
ment was intended not to assure the most widespread possible distribution of 
pornographic material but rather to allow communities to be more restrictive. 
The· Miller Court said that it would not require that the people of Maine or 
401. The foreign publisher may have intended to provide such material to minors or 
may, because foreign Web servers would not be subject to the statute, be working through a 
server that does not provide the means for inserting the PIeS activating signal. 
402. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text. 
403. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text. 
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Mississippi accept depictions tolerable in New York City or Las Vegas.404 It is 
despite this origin that the community standards requirement has come to be 
seen as limiting the authority to regulate. It is also the case, however, that 
arguments that the people of Maine or Mississippi ought not limit what 
residents of New York City or Las Vegas may see as reasonable, and the 
Supreme Court Reno v. ACLU decision expressed concern that the Internet 
indecency limitations of the Communications Decency Act would be judged 
by the standards of the community most likely to be offended.405 
The better response is based on the other reason for adopting a com-
munity standards test set out by the Miller Court. The Supreme Court noted 
that juries would be asked to answer a question of fact as to community 
standards, and the Court thought it was unrealistic to expect that a single 
formulation could be articulated that would cover all the states.406 But, the 
people of Maine and Mississippi are more likely to be in agreement with the 
people of New York City and Las Vegas over what violates standards of 
appropriateness for children than they are for adults. A national standard for 
what should be made available to children is, therefore, not unrealistic. In 
fact, the Supreme Court's Reno v. ACLU decision did leave standing the 
provision of section 223(a) barring knowingly transmitting obscene material 
to minors over the Internet.407 That would appear to reflect a lack of concern 
over geographic community, at least with regard to obscene materials. If, in 
fact, there would be less disagreement over the standards for what is obscene 
as to minors, there should be even less concern over a community standards 
test for that variety of obscenity based on the Internet community. 
D. Television and Videotapes 
Returning briefly to the issue of broadcast television, Ginsberg provides 
a strong, but constitutional, incentive for the television networks to adopt V-
chip ratings, at least for material with particularly strong content. If cable 
broadcasters can be held liable for the distribution to minors of material that 
is obscene as to children, when a minor sees such a program not accompanied 
by a V-chip signal, the greater authority to regulate the broadcast media, as 
shown by Pacifica, should make the application to broadcast television easily 
justified. The programs would be rated by the broadcasters, and like the dis-
tributor of "girlie magazines," they would be liable for the failure to take 
steps. to prevent access by minors to material later held to be obscene as to 
children. 
Videotapes may not raise as much concern as broadcast media, cable, 
and the Internet. Because such tapes must be purchased or rented, Ginsberg-
like liability could be found when a video store distributes a tape containing 
material that is obscene as to children to a minor. Nonetheless, Congress 
might choose to require that sexually explicit videotapes also contain the sig-
404. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 32 (1973). 
405. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329,2347-48 (1997). 
406. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 30. 
407. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. at 2350. 
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nal that activates the V -chip. Because viewing a videotape requires a 
television, the V -chip that will eventually be contained in televisions will limit 
the access of minors to objectionable tapes. Most commercial vicieotapes are 
already rated, and the only effect of such a law would be that manufacturers 
would include on the tape an electronic version of the rating already on the 
box. 
E. Depictions of Violence 
Since the entire approach suggested here has been based on Ginsberg, 
the application to depictions of violence would be less than obvious. 
Ginsberg recognized that what is obscene may vary with the audience. It is, 
however, the offensiveness, explicitness, and value with regard to the audience 
that allows the variation. Ginsberg does not provide for a variation in the type 
of subject matter that may be found obscene. 
The Supreme Court cases defining obscenity, such as Miller, have dis-
cussed only depictions of sexual or excretory organs or activities.408 Other 
cases have said that not all that is offensive is obscene and that, to be obscene, 
material must be erotic.409 These cases have led lower courts to conclude that 
only sexual or excretory material can be obscene and, specifically, that mate-
rial cannot be considered obscene based solely on the explicitness and 
offensiveness of the violence depicted.4lo 
I have argued elsewhere that limiting obscenity to sexual or excretory 
organs and activities is unwarranted and that a sufficiently explicit and offen-
sive depiction of violence can also come within the obscenity exception to the 
First Amendment.411 There is nothing in the ordinary language concept of 
obscenity that limits it to sex or excretion at the exclusion of violence. Case 
law and statutes relied on in establishing the obscenity exception in Roth,412 
or in English law prior to the late 18oos, also failed to establish a limitation to 
sex and excretion. It was only in the Victorian era, a constitutionally 
irrelevant era, that the limited view of obscenity developed.413 Furthermore, I 
have attempted to demonstrate that the First Amendment policies offered to 
justify the obscenity exception apply as well to violence as to sex or excretion. 
408. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 23-24. 
409. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,20 (1971); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 
476, 487-88 (1957). 
410. See, e.g., Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Webster, 773 F. Supp. 1275, 1276 
(W.O. Mo. 1991) (holding overbroad a Missouri statute that restricted the dissemination of 
videocassettes depicting "morbid" and "patently offensive" violence); Davis-Kidd 
Booksellers, Inc. v. McWherter, 866 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Tenn. 1993) (affirming the decision of 
Chancellor that Tennessee statute regulating the display of "materials deemed harmful to 
minors" did not violate the United States or Tennessee Constitutions, but the term "excess 
violence" was unconstitutionally vague). 
411. See generally KEVIN W. SAUNDERS, VIOLENCE AS OBSCENITY: UMmNG TIiE MEDIA'S 
FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECfION (1996). 
412. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at 489-90. 
413. SAUNDERS, supra note 411, at 87-110. 
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If the conclusion that sufficiently explicit and offensive violence can be 
obscene is accepted, then Ginsberg would indicate that there would also be a 
category of violent obscenity as to children. Material that would be accept-
able, when viewed by adults, could be obscene, when distributed to minors. 
Cable broadcasters, as well as over-the-air television, could face liability for 
violent material unaccompanied by a V-chip activating signal. Similarly, 
Internet providers would have to attach a PIeS activating tag to violent 
material.414 
414. Vagueness concerns would dictate that any statute be as specific as that in 
Ginsberg. In SAUNDERS, supra note 411, I suggested a statute such as the following: 
Disseminating Excessively Violent Material to Minors 
I. Disseminating Excessively Violent Material to Minors Proscribed: 
person is guilty of disseminating excessively violent material to minors 
when: 
1 . With knowledge of its character and content, he sells or loans to a 
minor for monetary consideration: 
(a) Any picture, photograph, drawing, sculpture, motion picture 
film, or similar visual representation or image which depicts 
actual or simulated: murder, manslaughter, rape, mayhem, 
battery, or an attempt to commit any of the preceding crimes 
and which, taken as a whole, is harmful to minors; or 
(b) Any book, pamphlet, magazine, printed matter however 
reproduced, or sound recording which contains any matter 
enumerated in paragraph (a) hereof and which, taken as a 
whole, is harmful to minors; or 
2. Knowing the character and content of a motion picture, show or 
other presentation which, in whole or in part, depicts crimes enu-
merated in paragraph (1)(a) hereof and which is harmful to minors, 
he: 
(a) Exhibits such motion picture, show or other presentation to a 
minor for a monetary consideration; or 
(b) Sells to a minor an admission ticket or pass to premises 
whereon there is exhibited or to be exhibited such motion 
picture, show or other presentation; or 
(c) Admits a minor for a monetary consideration to premises 
whereon there is exhibited or to be exhibited such motion 
picture show or other presentation. 
3 . An act done by or to a part-humanJpart-animal character, an animal 
character depicted as possessing human like mental character or a 
fictional creature depicted as possessing human like mental char-
acteristics and otherwise meeting the definitions for the crimes 
included this clause satisfies the definitional requirements of 
clause (1)(a) hereof. 
Disseminating excessively violent material to minors is a [misdemeanor of 
the _ degree][felony of the _ degree]. 
II. Definition of Terms 
The following definitions are applicable to subsection I hereof: 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The greatest criticism of the approach suggested here for protecting 
minors from indecency may be that it does not go far enough and would take 
too long to implement. It leaves the issue in the hands of parents, since par-
ents must activate the V -chip or the PICS software. That, however, is also a 
strength, from the point of view of constitutionality. Ginsberg was, in large 
part, based on the government interest in assisting parents in controlling the 
moral development of their children.415 When the government asserts its own 
interests in controlling the upbringing of children, it is on less secure 
ground.416 It will also take some time before all televisions and Internet soft-
ware contain the V -chip or PICS capability. Again, however, the decision is in 
the hands of parents. They can update their software and buy a television 
containing a V -chip or any retrofit device that may be manufactured for 
existing televisions.417 
From a constitutional law point of view, the approach taken is superior 
to those struck down and to the current V -chip legislation and should survive 
challenge. The government is not placed in the position of rating television 
or cable offerings and Internet communications. In addition to avoiding the 
great practical problems of rating such a sea of material, the specter of the 
1 . "Minor" means any person less than eighteen years old. 
2. "Harmful to minors" means that quality of any description or 
representation, in whatever form, of violence, when it: 
(a) Considered as a whole, appeals to the shameful or morbid 
interest in violence of minors; and 
(b) Is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult 
community as a whole with respect to what is suitable 
material for minors; and 
(c) Considered as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, 
political and -scientific value for minors. 
3. "Simulated" means the explicit depiction -or description of any of 
the types of conduct set forth in section I(l )(a) of this statute, 
which creates the appearance of such conduct. Simulations may 
include animated presentations. 
SAUNDERS, supra note 411, at 189-90 (citations omitted). The statute was based roughly on 
N.Y. PENAL LAw § 235.20-.21 (McKinney 1994), which is the current version of the statute 
addressing sexual material that was at issue in Ginsberg. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 
629, 631 (1968). 
415. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. at 639. 
416. But see id. at 640 (stating that the state has an independent interest in the well-
being of youth). 
417. The reliance on parent implementation may be more serious for violent material 
than for sexual matter. While the government and society may be argued not to have a strong 
interest in the moral development of other people's children, the interest in preventing 
children from becoming violent and doing harm to others is strong, both on the part of the 
government and on the part of the potential victims. 
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government licensor of speech is avoided. Each provider or publisher makes 
its own decision on the intended audience for the material it places in the 
electronic media. They do so at small expense and using currently available 
or mandated technology. They do bear the burden of mistake, in that the 
failure to attach the signal or tag to material that is later held to be obscene as 
to children may lead to criminal liability. That, however, is also the situation 
faced by the print distributor, who sells a copy of a magazine to a minor.418 
The Ginsberg Court did not find this too great a price to pay for protecting 
minors.419 
There is always a concern of a chilling effect where the regulation of 
speech is at issue. With obscenity law generally, there is the concern that 
material that is not obscene will remain unpublished because of fear that it 
might be found obscene or that the cost of litigating its status will be too 
costly. In such a case, protected material is negatively affected by the statute. 
The United States Supreme Court has not been swayed by such arguments in 
the obscenity context. The problem should cause even less concern here. 
Under the approach proposed, no one would be chilled into not publishing or 
not broadcasting protected material that is close to the border of the unpro-
tected. The effect on a publisher or producer who is chilled is simply to 
attach the V -chip signal or PICS activating tag. The producer or publisher is 
then protected. Furthermore, while minors may lose access to borderline 
material, parents who believe their children sufficiently mature as not to 
require protection may deactivate the V-chip or PICS screen. 
418. The electronic media may, in fact, be less burdened. The magazine seller must be 
aware of the nature of the material sold, while taking a chance on whether or not it will be found 
obscene. See, e.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 123-24 (1974) (holding where 
defendant mailed obscene brochures it was not necessary to prove that the defendant knew of 
the legal status of the material shipped--defendant's knowledge of the contents were 
sufficient). The producer of electronic material, or for that matter of print material, will have a 
better sense of the nature of the material than the vague awareness that a distributor may 
possess. 
419. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. at 640-43. 
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